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Abstract 
 
 
We use a natural experiment in the form of staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. 
states to show that tax considerations are a first-order determinant of firms’ capital structure choices. Over 
the period 1990-2011, firms increase long-term leverage by 114 basis points on average (equivalent to 
$62.1 million in extra debt) when their home state raises tax rates. Contrary to standard trade-off theory, the 
tax sensitivity of leverage is asymmetric: Firms do not reduce leverage in response to tax cuts. Using 
treatment reversals, we find this to be true even within-firm: Tax increases that are later reversed 
nonetheless lead to permanent increases in a firm’s leverage – an unexpected and novel form of hysteresis. 
Our findings are robust to various confounds such as unobserved variation in local business conditions or 
investment opportunities, union power, or states’ political leanings. Treatment effects are heterogeneous: 
Tax sensitivity is greater among profitable and investment-grade firms which respectively have a greater 
marginal tax benefit and lower marginal cost of issuing debt.  
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This paper provides evidence that taxes are a first-order determinant of firms’ capital structure 
choices. It is well known that debt confers a tax benefit on firms as interest payments can be 
deducted from taxable income. While this tax advantage of debt has been a cornerstone of modern 
corporate finance since at least Modigliani and Miller (1963), showing that it is empirically relevant 
has proved challenging, as firms generally differ both in their marginal benefits and marginal costs 
of debt. We address this identification challenge by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in 
corporate income tax rates across U.S. states and time. These tax changes exogenously vary firms’ 
marginal benefit of debt without, as we will show, affecting their marginal cost of debt. We can thus 
trace out the marginal-cost-of-debt curve for U.S. firms. Its shape turns out to be surprising.  
Our first contribution is to empirically confirm the importance of the tax benefit of debt. We 
exploit the natural experiment offered by staggered changes in state corporate income tax rates 
using a difference-in-difference approach. Unlike federal tax changes, which occur infrequently and 
affect all firms simultaneously, many states change their corporate tax rates and they do so at 
different times.1 We find that firms increase the amount of debt in their capital structure following 
an increase in the rate at which their home state taxes corporate income, relative to a set of control 
firms operating in the same industry at the same time but located in states without tax changes.  
The magnitude of the tax sensitivity is economically meaningful. The point estimates show that 
over the period from 1990 to 2011, firms respond to a tax rise by increasing their long-term 
leverage by an average of 114 basis points from the pre-treatment average of 18.2%, equivalent to 
an extra $62.1 million of debt for the average firm. Our estimates imply a tax elasticity of 0.58. 
Interestingly, leverage is at least three times more responsive to tax increases than to changes in 
standard determinants of leverage used in empirical capital structure studies, such as profitability, 
tangibility, size, and market-to-book. Thus, taxes appear to be a first-order determinant of leverage. 
Interestingly, the estimated tax sensitivity is asymmetric. While firms borrow more in response 
                                                          
1 Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011) use this natural experiment to model exogenous shocks to firms’ after-tax 
returns on investment but find no effect on investment among stock market-listed firms. 
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to tax rises, tax cuts do not lead to a corresponding cut in leverage. This is true even within-firm: 
Tax rises that are later reversed nonetheless increase leverage permanently. This dynamic result 
suggests that leverage not only responds asymmetrically to tax changes but also is path-dependent 
and so exhibits hysteresis. Neither asymmetry nor hysteresis has previously been documented.  
To provide context, Figure 1a presents the capital structure argument typically found in finance 
textbooks.2 The value of a levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered firm plus the tax 
benefit of debt minus the (net) cost of debt.3 The optimal level of debt equates the marginal tax 
benefit and the marginal cost. To square this textbook “trade-off theory” with the observed 
asymmetry would require the following modification. Rather than being linear, as trade-off theory 
assumes, the cost curve has a kink at the firm’s pre-treatment level of debt: Tax-induced reductions 
in debt appear to be infinitely costly at the margin. This finding is our second contribution. We 
speculate in the conclusions what might cause leverage to be downward sticky in this way. 
To understand our identification strategy, consider the ideal experiment shown in Figure 1b: It 
consists of randomly assigning different tax rates to firms and then comparing their debt policies to 
see if higher tax rates lead to higher leverage. Random assignment would ensure that observed 
differences in leverage could not be caused by unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. This, in turn, 
would allow us to estimate the marginal-cost curve from shifts in the marginal (tax) benefit curve. 
Observational data are, of course, not random. Empirical studies typically relate observed 
differences in debt policies among firms to differences in their actual tax rates. This approach is 
fraught with difficulties; it risks falsely attributing observed differences in leverage to differences in 
taxes when other unobserved differences across firms also likely affect leverage. For example, prior 
work exploits the fact that higher profits put firms into a higher tax bracket. As a result, high-profit 
firms may borrow more to take advantage of tax shields, as shown in Figure 1c. But it is equally 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2011), chapter 18. 
3 Debt is costly due to bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)) and debt-overhang inefficiencies (Myers (1977)). To 
isolate the tax benefit of debt, non-tax benefits of debt (e.g., curbing free-cash flow problems (Jensen (1986)) are 
usually counted as negative costs for expositional purposes (see, e.g., van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010)). 
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possible that they borrow more because their default risk is lower than that of low-profit firms.  
A simple comparison cannot tell if high-profit firms borrow more because debt offers valuable 
tax shields or because their marginal cost of debt is lower. Unobserved differences across firms 
would impart a positive bias in the estimated tax benefit. Figure 1d illustrates the extreme case in 
which the null hypothesis that taxes have no effect on leverage is true. As drawn, we would falsely 
reject the null, as all of the observed change in leverage is due to differences in the marginal cost of 
debt. More generally, in the presence of unobserved differences in marginal costs, the effect of 
taxes on debt is not identified. This is the challenge our natural experiment is designed to overcome. 
We illustrate the essence of our identification strategy with a simple example. In 1991, North 
Carolina raised its top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 7.75%. Following this tax rise, firms 
headquartered in NC increased long-term leverage from 19.8% to 21.8% on average. The tax rise is 
plausibly exogenous from the viewpoint of an individual firm in NC.4 But this is not sufficient to 
establish causality since other coincident developments could be responsible for the observed 
increase in leverage. For example, NC may be home to firms from an industry that suffered some 
other, non-tax-related leverage-increasing shock in 1991. Or investment opportunities in NC may 
have changed in 1991 in a way that made an increase in debt desirable, regardless of the tax rise.  
To control for such contemporaneous industry- and state-specific developments, we compare 
leverage changes among North Carolina firms to the contemporaneous changes in leverage among 
firms that operate in the same industry but are located in states without tax changes in 1991, say in 
South Carolina. To the extent that SC firms face similar investment opportunities as NC firms, 
holding industry constant, the contemporaneous change in their leverage provides an estimate of 
how NC firms’ leverage would have evolved absent the tax increase. The difference-in-differences, 
i.e., the difference (across firms in different states operating in the same industry) of the within-firm 
change in leverage, gives the desired estimate of the tax sensitivity of corporate debt policy. 
                                                          
4 For a start, firms presumably do not lobby for tax increases. (Unions might conceivably do so, but as we will show, 
this does not appear to be the case.) We will address other potential confounds at length throughout the paper. 
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The identifying assumption central to a causal interpretation of our diff-in-diff estimates is that 
treated and control firms are only randomly different. This requires that residual variation in state 
tax changes, conditional on a set of control variables, be uncorrelated with unobserved determinants 
of leverage. Our results cannot be confounded by unobserved time-varying industry shocks (as we 
include industry-year fixed effects), by unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity (as we first-
difference the data), or by firm-level variation in performance or characteristics (as we condition on 
standard firm-level determinants of leverage). They are also robust to including state fixed effects.  
The only remaining type of omitted variable that could confound our results is one that varies 
within states across time and so is collinear with the dimension of the tax-change treatment. For 
example, if a state suffers a recession and revenues fall, it may increase corporate taxes to balance 
its budget. In response to the same recession, firms in that state may have to borrow more to support 
their operations. In that case, our estimate of the tax effect would be upward biased: We would 
wrongly conclude that taxes affect leverage, when in truth local conditions determine both.  
We address this important concern in four ways. First, we show that states do not raise corporate 
taxes in response to changes in local conditions (such as state growth or unemployment rates). 
Second, we show that observed variation in local conditions cannot explain observed leverage 
changes. Third, we actually find stronger treatment effects when we restrict control firms to those 
located in states bordering a treated state. To the extent that firms in neighboring states share similar 
economic conditions, this result suggests that instead of leading us to overestimate the sensitivity of 
debt to tax rises, unobserved variation in local conditions biases our estimates downward. Fourth, a 
sharp regression-discontinuity test using firms located in adjacent counties on either side of a state 
border confirms this: The estimated tax sensitivity more than doubles, to about 250 basis points. We 
show that this increase reflects a tendency for tax rises to coincide with unobserved changes in local 
conditions that would otherwise cause firms to reduce their leverage absent the tax change. By 
implication, there must be strong geographic clustering in corporate debt policies, even absent tax 
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shocks. Such clustering has not previously been documented. This is our third contribution. 
Our estimates of the tax sensitivity of debt are likely conservative. The reason is that firms are 
taxed in every state they have a substantial connection (“nexus”) with, in the form of facilities, staff, 
or sales. Detailed data on a firm’s nexus are not available, which is why we focus on tax changes in 
a firm’s HQ state. The resulting measurement error will attenuate the estimated tax sensitivity, to 
the extent that sample firms have operations outside their HQ state. We confirm this using two 
falsification tests. The first documents that multinationals show no tendency to respond to state tax 
changes, while domestic firms respond strongly. The second exploits industry-level variation in the 
extent to which firms ship their products outside their home state. Here, we find stronger tax effects 
for firms in industries with low inter-state sales. Both tests are consistent with the expected 
attenuation bias – but only for tax increases. We continue to find an asymmetric tax sensitivity, 
suggesting that the absence of a leverage response to tax cuts is not due to measurement error.  
Theory suggests that the value of tax shields varies with the interplay of personal and corporate 
taxes (Miller (1977)), profitability, and debt capacity. This suggests three validation tests. The first 
exploits Miller’s insight that high personal tax rates on equity income should dampen the impact of 
a corporate tax change on leverage. Using two proxies for personal taxes that vary in the cross-
section, we find evidence to support this comparative static. The second test shows that unlike 
profitable firms, loss-making firms do not borrow more in response to tax rises. This is consistent 
with a link between taxes and leverage since loss-making firms have no profits to shield from taxes. 
The third test shows that the sensitivity of debt to tax increases is concentrated among investment-
grade firms (which have flatter marginal-cost curves) and entirely absent among firms rated junk. 
Each of these validation tests supports a causal interpretation of the observed tax sensitivity of debt. 
We proceed as follows. Section 1 situates our paper in the literature. Section 2 outlines our 
empirical strategy. Section 3 provides an overview of state corporate income taxation in the U.S. 
Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
  
6
1. Related Literature 
While the literature on taxes and capital structure is vast (Graham’s (2008) survey cites more 
than 200 published articles), ours is the first study to exploit changes in U.S. states’ corporate taxes 
over time. This quasi-experimental setting has the potential to offer a clean causal interpretation of 
the estimated effect of taxes on firms’ capital structure decisions. 
The early empirical literature found inconclusive results, which led Myers (1984) to remark that 
“I know of no study clearly demonstrating that a firm’s tax status has predictable, material effects 
on its debt policy.” Taking up this challenge, MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996a, 1996b) 
find a significant positive relation between estimates of a firm’s estimated or simulated marginal tax 
rate and its debt policy. However, Fama and French (1998) caution that cross-sectional studies are 
vulnerable to endogeneity biases as firms’ effective tax rates may correlate with omitted variables.  
To clarify our contribution, we briefly discuss prior attempts at exploiting variation in tax rates 
to identify the tax sensitivity of debt, beginning with cross-country studies. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) find that firms in countries with higher corporate tax rates use more debt. Similarly, Booth et 
al. (2001) find a positive relation between country-level tax rates and country averages of leverage 
in a sample of 17 countries. Faccio and Xu (2011) use variation in tax rates across and within 29 
OECD countries to show that leverage increases with taxes only in countries with little tax evasion.  
A common concern in cross-country studies is that treated and control firms are located in 
different countries and so may differ in ways that affect their debt policies. It is debatable whether it 
is reasonable to assume that, say, a South Korean carmaker is a valid control for a Swiss pharma 
company, in the specific sense that both share the same marginal cost function (see Figure 1c).  
Single-country studies can potentially sidestep this problem. A popular exogenous shock is the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (see Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1991), Givoly et al. (1992), and van 
Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010)).5 But since this change in federal taxes affected all firms at 
                                                          
5 Lin and Flannery (2012) study the 2003 Bush cuts in personal taxes, finding an effect on firm leverage. 
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(roughly) the same time, there is no obvious control group with which to disentangle the impact of 
the Act from other concurrent changes that could affect debt policies (such as changes in interest 
rates, inflation, the business cycle, or financial regulation).6 Using state-level tax changes, which are 
staggered across states and time, thus provides potentially cleaner identification. 
2. Empirical Strategy 
We examine the effect of changes in states’ corporate income tax rates on firms’ use of debt 
using a difference-in-difference regression approach of the form: 
ijstjtstitststijst ZXTTD    1111     (1) 
where i, j, s, and t index firms, industries, states, and years;  is the first-difference operator; Dist is 
a measure of debt usage;  1stT  and  1stT  are indicators equaling one if state s increased or cut its 
corporate tax rate in year t–1, respectively; Xit–1 and Zst–1 are firm- and state-level control variables; 
jt are industry-year fixed effects; and ijst is the usual error term. The coefficients of interest,  and 
, capture the effects of tax increases and tax cuts on firms’ debt usage. First-differencing removes 
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects in the corresponding levels equation, while including 
industry-year fixed effects allows us to remove unobserved industry shocks.7 
Regression (1) generalizes the illustrative example in the introduction in three ways. First, it 
exploits variation in taxes across many states and years, rather than just North Carolina’s 1991 tax 
increase. For any change in corporate income tax in state s at time t, the potential control states are 
all those states that did not change their corporate income tax rates at that time (though we will also 
consider finer control sets). Second, regression (1) allows for covariates that vary at the firm- or 
state-level and over time. For example, we can control for time-varying factors at the state level that 
may be correlated with changes in both state taxes and firm leverage, while firm-level covariates 
                                                          
6 Van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010) cleverly exploit slight timing differences in exposure to the 1986 tax 
reform due to variation in firms’ fiscal-year ends.  
7 This is preferable to including average industry leverage as a regressor, as is often done in the capital structure 
literature. Gormley and Matsa (2012) show analytically that accounting for unobserved group-level heterogeneity by 
including the group average of the dependent variable as a control can lead to bias. To ensure consistency of the 
parameters of interest, models should instead include group fixed effects (here: industry-year fixed effects).  
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control for other firm-level determinants of debt policies. Including industry-year fixed effects 
allows us to compare treated and control firms within the same industry at the same point in time. 
Third, the regression distinguishes between tax increases and tax cuts. Hence, we can discriminate 
between a classic, symmetric tax benefit of debt and an asymmetric one.  
The key identifying assumption is that conditional on covariates Xit–1 and Zst–1 and on industry-
year fixed effects, the tax change in state s is as good as randomly assigned. Put differently, the 
estimates of  and   in regression (1) give the causal treatment effects of tax increases and tax cuts 
on debt as long as any omitted determinants of capital structure (which are left in the error term ijst) 
are uncorrelated with state-level tax changes. Given our set-up, this identifying assumption can only 
be violated by confounds that vary at the state-year level.  
3. State Corporate Income Taxes 
3.1 Overview 
Most states tax corporate activities within their borders,8 and most do so using a tax on profits.9 
Firms are subject to state taxes if they have “nexus” with a state, usually meaning they derive 
income from sales in the state, have employees in the state, or own or lease property in the state.10 
In 2012, top marginal tax rates vary from a low of 4.63% in Colorado to a high of 12% in Iowa. 
They have also varied considerably over time, and it is this variation that we exploit to identify the 
tax sensitivity of corporate debt policies. We first discuss tax increases. 
3.2 Tax Increases 
Using data obtained from the Tax Foundation, a think tank, and the “Current Corporate Income 
Tax Developments” feature published periodically in the Journal of State Taxation, Appendix A 
                                                          
8 The exceptions, as of 2012, are NV, SD, and WY. See http://www.scribd.com/doc/84126982/state-corp-income-rates-
2000-2012-20120216.  
9 The exceptions, as of 2012, are OH, TX, and WA, which use a gross receipts tax assessed on revenue rather than on 
income. See http://www.scribd.com/doc/84126982/state-corp-income-rates-2000-2012-20120216. 
10 States distinguish between multi-state firms (those with nexus with more than one state) and single-state firms. Under 
the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, multi-state firms pay taxes in each state they have nexus with, at 
rates and on terms determined by each state. Typically, states apportion the net income of a multi-state firm using three 
weights: The ratio of the firm’s sales in the state to its total sales, the ratio of the firm’s payroll in the state to its total 
payroll, and the ratio of the firm’s property in the state to its total property. 
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lists 38 tax increases in 25 states affecting 1,824 firms in 1990-2011. For example, in 1999, New 
Hampshire increased its top rate from 7% to 8%. The average shock increases top rates by 90 basis 
points, or 13% relative to the previous year’s top rate (though as more firms are located in states 
with larger tax rises, the average treated firm experiences an increase of 1.24 percentage points).  
To put these numbers into perspective, consider the implications for firms’ tax bills. In the year 
before a tax increase, the average (profitable) sample firm headquartered in that state earns pre-tax 
income of $237.5 million. Relative to this baseline, state corporate income tax increases would cost 
the average (profitable) firm an additional $2.78 million in taxes a year,11 absent a response, or a 
total of $3.8 billion across all treated (profitable) firms.  
Eighteen of the 38 tax rises occurred in the 1990s and 20 in the 2000s. (Our results are nearly 
identical in either decade.) Figure 2 maps affected states over consecutive five-year periods to show 
the geographic and time-series distribution of the tax shocks. Geographically, there is little 
clustering: There are only seven neighboring states that raise taxes at the same time (KY-WV-MO-
NE-OK in 1990 and TN-KY in 2002). There is somewhat more clustering over time: The busiest 
quinquennia are 1990-1994 and 2000-2004, which hints at a possible link between recessions and 
tax increases (though there have been surprisingly few tax increases in the wake of the 2007-8 
financial crisis and subsequent recession).  
Clearly, states do not change tax rates in a vacuum. This will not affect identification unless the 
reasons they do so simultaneously affect corporate debt policies. For example, Figure 2 suggests 
that tax rises may coincide with economic downturns. If firms also borrow more in downturns, this 
could lead to a spurious (rather than causal) correlation between taxes and leverage. Alternatively, 
corporate tax increases may reflect strong union power in the state. This could lead to a spurious 
correlation if firms use leverage strategically when bargaining with their unions, as Matsa (2010) 
argues. Finally, corporate tax changes could coincide with changes in personal taxes that could 
                                                          
11 Or up to 35% less if the firm has a sufficiently large federal tax bill from which to deduct its increased state taxes. 
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either amplify or attenuate the effects of corporate taxes on leverage (assuming that the holders of a 
firm’s debt and equity are mainly located in the firm’s headquarter state). For example, Miller 
(1977) shows that higher personal taxes on interest income reduce the value of debt tax shields. 
To investigate these concerns, Table 1 relates the probability that a state changes its top 
corporate income tax rate in year t to lagged real growth in gross state product (GSP), the state’s 
lagged unemployment rate, the lagged fraction of the state’s private sector employees who belong to 
a union, and changes in a state’s personal taxes on wages and on long-term capital gains. (For all 
variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C.) We also control for local 
political conditions using the share of votes cast for the Democratic candidate in the most recent 
prior Presidential election. We estimate linear probability models with year indicators and state 
fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the state level. 
Column 1 focuses on tax increases. Neither real GSP growth nor state unemployment has any 
effect on the probability that a state raises its corporate income tax. To illustrate, a one-standard-
deviation worsening in real GSP growth or state unemployment is associated with only a 0.1 
percentage point change in the likelihood of a tax rise, which is economically small relative to the 
unconditional likelihood of 3.4%. The same applies to union membership: The estimated coefficient 
is 0.001 for a one-standard deviation effect of 0.6 percentage points (p=0.811).  
A state’s political leanings, on the other hand, have a large effect: A one-standard deviation 
increase in the share of the vote won by the Democratic candidate in the previous Presidential 
election is associated with a 6.2 percentage-point greater likelihood that the state subsequently 
raises corporate taxes (p=0.011). This suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that left-leaning states tax 
their corporations more aggressively. If, for whatever reason, firms respond to increasing 
Democratic support in their home state by taking on more debt, it is possible that the observed 
positive correlation between tax rises and leverage increases is not causal. Since changes in political 
leanings are observable, we can investigate this possible confound directly. As we will show, our 
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results are robust to controlling for observed differences in political leanings across states.  
Finally, we find no evidence that changes in corporate state taxation coincide with changes in 
personal state taxes on income or capital gains.12 Overall, tax changes appear largely idiosyncratic. 
3.3 Tax Cuts 
Over the 1990-2011 period, we count 67 state corporate income tax cuts in 29 states affecting 
7,021 firms (see Appendix B for details). For example, in 2001, Arizona cut its top rate from 
7.968% to 6.968%. On average, tax rates are cut by 60 basis points. In the year before a tax cut, the 
average (profitable) firm earns pre-tax income of $235.1 million. Relative to this baseline, state 
corporate income tax cuts would save the average (profitable) firm $1.2 million in taxes a year, all 
else equal, or a total of $4.97 billion across all treated (profitable) firms.  
Thirty-four of the 67 tax cuts occurred in the 1990s and 33 in the 2000s. Figure 2 shows the 
geographic and time-series distribution of these tax shocks. Tax cuts are spread out fairly evenly 
across time and like tax increases do not tend to cluster geographically.13  
Column 2 of Table 1 relates the probability that a state cuts corporate tax rates to local economic 
and political conditions and changes in personal state taxes. The only variable with a significant 
effect (and even then only at the 10% level) is lagged GSP growth: States are more likely to cut 
taxes, the higher their growth rates in the previous year. Economically, the effect is relatively small: 
A one-standard deviation increase in lagged GSP growth is associated with a 1.4 percentage-point 
increase in the probability of a tax cut, relative to the unconditional probability of 5.8%. 
4. Sample and Data 
4.1 Sample  
Our sample consists of all U.S. companies traded on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq over the 
                                                          
12 The Table 1 regression uses lagged changes in state taxes on income and capital gains. We find the same result if we 
use contemporaneous changes in state taxes on income and capital gains, but we lose one year since the personal-tax 
data we use is currently only available through 2010. See http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates. 
13 Of the 67 tax cuts, 51 occur in states whose neighbors do not cut their taxes in the same year. The remaining 16 form 
seven mini clusters: NJ-NY-PA (1994), PA-NY-CT (1995), NY-CT (1999), AZ-CO (2000), NY-CT, KY-OH (2005), 
and KY-WV (2007). 
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period 1989-2011 satisfying the following filters. From the merged CRSP-Compustat Fundamentals 
Annual database, we exclude financial firms (SIC=6; 42,970 observations), utilities (SIC=49; 4,939 
observations), public-sector entities (SIC=9; 1,268 observations), non-U.S. firms (13,895 
observations), and firms traded OTC or in the Pink Sheets (1,772 observations). We also drop firm-
years with negative or missing total assets (224 observations) or missing return on assets (583 
observations), and firms with a single panel year (885 observations) or a CRSP share code >11 
(REITS etc.; 2,978 observations). Finally, while cleaning up firms’ headquarter states (see below), 
we filter out 986 observations of firms that were headquartered outside the U.S. The final sample 
consists of 91,172 firm-years for 10,105 firms (though the need to lag certain variables as well as 
gaps in the panel structure of some firms will reduce the sample size used in our regressions).  
4.2 Firms’ Use of Debt 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for sample firms’ use of debt and for our control variables. 
(For all variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C.) There are many ways 
to measure how much debt a firm uses to fund its operations. Most studies use a leverage measure, 
though definitions of leverage vary along two dimensions: Book vs. market leverage and the 
maturity of debt that is included. Some studies use the sum of short-term and long-term debt over 
total assets, while others focus on long-term leverage.  
As we will show, our results are robust to using any of these measures, but there are good 
reasons to expect long-term leverage to be the most sensitive to tax changes. Short-term debt is used 
mostly for working capital needs and so is unlikely to be altered in response to tax changes, a 
conjecture that proves to be true in the data. Thus, we focus on long-term debt. This, in turn, can be 
measured with or without the portion of long-term debt that is due within a year and so is classified 
as short-term debt. When tax rates increase, firms can respond by issuing long-term debt, but they 
cannot increase the “current” portion of their existing long-term debt, which instead varies 
mechanically with the passage of time as a debt facility nears maturity. This suggests that we should 
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focus on changes in long-term debt excluding debt due within a year.  
Finally, we prefer to model book leverage because firms have greater control over book 
leverage (which is a function of debt outstanding and the size of the balance sheet) than over market 
leverage (which in part reflects share prices). Thus, book leverage is a cleaner measure of debt 
policy, though as we will show, our results are robust to modeling market leverage instead. As 
Table 2 shows, long-term book leverage averages 17.2% in our sample (18.2% before a tax rise).  
Because leverage measures are ratios, variation in leverage could capture variation in the 
denominator (the book or market value of assets) rather than the numerator (debt). It is therefore 
useful to model not just leverage but also debt levels. Table 2 shows that the average sample firm 
has long-term debt of $383.9 million. 
4.3 Control Variables 
We control for the standard financial variables commonly found in empirical models of debt 
(see, for example, Frank and Goyal (2009)): Profitability (return on assets), firm size (total assets), 
tangibility (the ratio of fixed to total assets), and investment opportunities (market-to-book). As 
Table 2 shows, the average sample firm has ROA of 3.4% and $1,676.5 million in total assets, 
26.4% of which is tangible, and trades at a market-to-book ratio of 1.841. In addition, we use the 
default spread (the difference between the yield on Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds) to control 
for conditions in the credit markets. In the average firm-year, this measures 95.5 basis points. 
Finally, some specifications control for economic conditions in a firm’s home state using the growth 
in gross state product (GSP), the state unemployment rate, and a proxy for the state’s sales growth 
rate. These average 2.9%, 5.8%, and 18.9%, respectively.  
Table 2 also shows firm- and state-level conditions one year before a tax rise or tax cut. This 
reveals a slow-down in GSP growth, lower profits, and higher default spreads ahead of a tax rise. 
4.4 Firm Headquarter Locations 
Compustat’s location data suffer from a major flaw: Compustat reports the address of a firm’s 
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current principal executive office, not its historic headquarter location. Many studies ignore this 
source of measurement error, treating it as noise. However, in our setting, it is more likely to induce 
bias. If the null of no association between tax and leverage is false, false negatives (firms that are in 
fact located in a tax-change state but appear not to be) will reduce the estimated tax sensitivity, as 
their leverage changes despite the (apparent) absence of a tax change. Similarly, false positives 
(firms that appear to be located in a tax-change state but in fact are not) will seem to fail to respond 
to a tax change (though of course there was none). This will bias the tests in favor of a false null.  
To remedy this, we extract historic headquarter states for each firm-year in our sample from 
regulatory filings. Specifically, for each fiscal year, we look up each sample firm’s headquarter state 
as listed in the firm’s most recent 10-Q prior to the fiscal year-end using the SEC’s EDGAR service 
(mostly, from May 1996 onwards) and Thomson Research (between 1990 and May 1996). 
Errors prove widespread, affecting a non-trivial fraction of the Compustat universe. Overall, 
Compustat’s HQ state information is incorrect in 9,246 firm-years (10.1% of the total) affecting 
1,532 firms (15.2% of all non-financial and non-utility U.S. firms in Compustat).14 Not surprisingly, 
the problem gets worse the further back in time we go. Figure 3 shows the annual fraction of sample 
firms whose historic HQ state is misrecorded in Compustat. Using a download dated August 2010 
(covering fiscal years 1990-2009), we see that 1% of firms’ HQ states are misrecorded in fiscal year 
2009, rising monotonically to 16.6% in fiscal year 1991. Thus, where firms are today is often quite 
different from where they were a decade or two ago.15  
Importantly, cleaning up firms’ HQ locations allows us to remedy 141 false positive and 186 
false negative tax increases and 505 false positive and 568 false negative tax cuts.  
                                                          
14 A new database, the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite, aims to provide users “historical information on state of 
incorporation and headquarters”, among other items. SEC Analytics appears to pull HQ information not from the filing 
itself, but from EDGAR’s “filing detail page.” Unfortunately, this page is frequently out of date for years at a time, 
apparently because the SEC does not update its database on firm locations in a timely fashion. SEC Analytics also has 
problems matching filings to the correct gvkey, for example (but not exclusively) when two firms merge. As a result, 
SEC Analytics misses around one third of the corrections we make to Compustat’s HQ location variable. 
15 There is a further twist: In 2010 and 2011, the error rate is actually higher than in 2009, at 5.6% and 4.3%. This 
reflects the fact that Compustat now frequently fails to record a firm’s headquarter state altogether. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Graphical Evidence 
Figure 4 tests graphically whether firm leverage responds to tax changes. It plots the average 
annual within-firm change in long-term leverage in years t = –2 to t = +2 for the group of firms 
experiencing a corporate income tax change in their home state at t = 0 (‘treated’ firms) and, for 
comparison, the group of firms not subject to a tax change in their home state (‘control’ firms). We 
remove time-varying changes in industry conditions by including industry-year fixed effects.  
Figure 4a shows responses to tax rises. In the two years before a tax rise, leverage changes are 
tiny and statistically insignificant for both treated and control firms, suggesting there are no pre-
trends to worry about. In the year of the tax rise, neither group adjusts leverage much. In year t+1, 
on the other hand, we see sizeable and significant increases in leverage among treated firms, 
averaging 105 basis points (p<0.001), while the leverage of control firms falls by an insignificant 13 
basis points on average. The diff-in-diff estimate of 118 basis points is highly significant (p<0.001). 
It is consistent with the interpretation that firms respond to higher taxes in their home state by 
borrowing more, with a one-year lag. The effect is sizeable: Relative to the unconditional pre-
increase mean of 18.2% (see Table 2), firms increase their long-term leverage by 6.5% following a 
tax rise (=0.0118/0.182). This is equivalent to $64.4 million more debt per firm on average.16 There 
is little evidence that firms subsequently reverse these leverage increases in year t+2.  
The response to tax cuts, shown in Figure 4b, is quite different. Neither treated nor control firms 
change their leverage by much, if at all, in the five years surrounding tax cuts. In year 0, affected 
firms actually increase leverage, by 12 basis points relative to unaffected firms. In the next two 
years, they decrease leverage a bit, by 16 and 11 basis points for a total reduction over the three 
years of 14 basis points. None of these diff-in-diff estimates is statistically significant. 
                                                          
16 Assuming equity (E) remains constant, an x percent increase in leverage implies that debt D increases by the amount 
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5.2 Conditional Estimates of the Tax Sensitivity of Debt 
The changes in leverage illustrated in Figure 4 could potentially be driven by coincident 
changes in firms’ financial characteristics that are unrelated to the tax changes. To control for these, 
Table 3 reports standard leverage regressions estimated using OLS in first-differences (to remove 
time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity) and including a full set of SIC4-year effects (to 
remove the effects of unobserved time-varying industry shocks).17  
The variables of interest in column 1 are the two indicators for state tax increases and state tax 
cuts. These capture the treatment effects of signed tax changes on corporate debt policies relative to 
firms in the same industry that are not subject to tax changes in their headquarter states that year, 
conditional on a set of control variables.18 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level; later, they 
will be validated using randomly generated pseudo shocks. 
The results show that firms increase long-term leverage by 114 basis points on average in 
response to a tax rise (p<0.001), relative to other firms in the same industry at the same time. The 
estimated treatment effect is nearly identical to the unconditional increase of 118 basis points in 
Figure 4a. This indicates that the covariates we control for in the regression change little around the 
time states increase their corporate taxes. In fact, these standard determinants of leverage have quite 
modest economic effects: One standard deviation changes in profitability, size, tangibility, or 
market-to-book are associated with at most a 30 basis point change in leverage. This is no more 
than a quarter of the observed sensitivity to tax rises. By contrast, a 114 basis-point increase in 
leverage is economically meaningful. Relative to the average pre-treatment leverage ratio of 18.2%, 
it represents an increase of 6.3% (=0.0114/0.182) or $62.1 million in extra debt on average.19  
To assess the impact of cleaning up firms’ historic HQ locations, we estimate (but do not report) 
                                                          
17 The industry-year effects also capture nationwide shocks that affect all industries at the same time.  
18 Put differently, we compare the change in industry-adjusted leverage of treated firms to the change in industry-
adjusted leverage of control firms that are located in other states, holding covariates constant. 
19 As a reality check, we compare the average annual tax savings on $62.1 million in additional debt to the $2.78 million 
average increase in firms’ tax bills absent a leverage response (see Section 3.2). Assuming an effective marginal tax rate 
of 30.5% (Graham and Mills (2008)) and a coupon of 5%, the resulting annual tax saving is $2.2m (=0.05*(1–0.305)* 
$62.1m). This is in the same ballpark as the tax increase, with the difference representing expected distress costs.  
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leverage regressions using Compustat’s “current” locations. This yields an estimated sensitivity to 
tax increases of 87 basis points, 27 basis points below the “true” estimate of 114 basis points shown 
in column 1. This confirms that measurement error in firms’ HQ locations leads to attenuation bias.  
Could the observed sensitivity to tax increases simply be random? The standard errors suggest 
not, but an alternative way to answer this question is to generate “pseudo shocks” as in Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically, we randomly generate 1,000 sets of 38 “pseudo tax 
increases” and 67 “pseudo tax cuts” (to match the observed number of actual tax shocks). Since the 
pseudo shocks are random, we know that the null of no tax sensitivity is true. Indeed, the mean of 
the 1,000 estimates of the effect of the pseudo tax increases or pseudo tax cuts on leverage is zero. 
More interestingly, we never see coefficients as large as those estimated using the actual tax 
increases. Thus, based on these simulations, there is a zero in 1,000 chance of randomly observing 
the Table 3 coefficients when the null of no tax sensitivity is in fact true. This suggests that the 
clustered standard errors in Table 3 are, if anything, slightly conservative.  
Next, we consider variation in the magnitude of each state’s tax change instead of using tax 
change indicators. Column 2 regresses changes in long-term leverage on changes in top marginal 
tax rates.20 The results mirror those in our baseline model: Leverage increases as tax rates go up 
(p=0.063). The coefficient estimate of 0.347 allows us to compute the elasticity of debt with respect 
to taxes, 
c
c
L
L


/
/ . The numerator is our coefficient estimate. To compute the denominator, we use 
the average firm’s leverage of 18.2% from Table 2 for L and Graham and Mills’ (2008) estimate of 
30.5% for the average firm’s effective marginal tax rate. This gives a tax elasticity of 0.58.  
5.3 Asymmetry: Sensitivity to Tax Cuts 
In stark contrast to firms’ responses to tax rises, we find no evidence that firms cut leverage in 
response to tax cuts. Column 1 shows an average tax-cut treatment effect of minus 3.6 basis points. 
                                                          
20 Three tax increases (CA 2002, NJ 2002, and MI 2008) and one tax cut (TX 2008) cannot be summarized in terms of 
changes in marginal tax rates (though their effects on tax shields are unambiguous; see Appendix A and B). Treated 
firms affected by these four tax changes are dropped from this regression. 
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This has the expected negative sign but is economically tiny and statistically insignificant 
(p=0.826). Conditioning on the size of the tax cut, in column 2, also yields a small and insignificant 
effect. These patterns mirror Figure 4b. They suggest that the tax sensitivity of debt is asymmetric: 
Firms increase leverage when taxes rise but apparently do not reduce leverage when taxes are cut. 
Columns 1 and 2 include all treated firms regardless of the type of treatment they experienced. 
Thus, it is theoretically possible that firms suffering a tax increase are in some unobserved way 
different from firms experiencing a tax cut and that it is this unobserved difference that accounts for 
the asymmetry. Column 3 adds firm fixed effects to the first-difference specification (alongside the 
industry-year effects already included). It thus controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
across firms with regard to changes in leverage. The coefficient for tax increases hardly changes 
and the effect of tax cuts remains insignificant, so we continue to find an asymmetric tax sensitivity. 
Including firm fixed effects goes some way towards ruling out spurious asymmetry, but our data 
permit an even stronger test. We can restrict the treatment sample to firms experiencing treatment 
reversals, meaning those that first face a tax increase and then, some time later, a tax cut (possibly 
in another state if they have moved in the meantime). There are 490 such firms in our sample. Using 
this treatment group and again including firm fixed effects, column 4 shows evidence of a form of 
dynamic asymmetry: When hit with a tax rise, firms increase their leverage strongly and 
significantly but when later experiencing a tax cut, the same firms fail to reduce leverage again.21  
Figure 5a illustrates the implications of these findings graphically. The results in columns 1-3 of 
Table 3 trace out a marginal-cost-of-debt curve that is positively sloped above the pre-treatment 
level of debt and infinitely sloped below the pre-treatment level of debt. Standard trade-off theory, 
shown earlier in Figure 1a, predicts no kink in the marginal cost of debt. To square trade-off theory 
with our evidence would require the modification shown in Figure 5b: The total net cost of debt is 
upward sloping and convex above the “optimal” debt level, as in trade-off theory, but flat below it.  
                                                          
21 It is not the case that the subsequent tax cuts are simply too small to respond to. In fact, the average tax cut in the 
reversal sample measures 64 basis points, a little more than the unconditional average cut of 60 basis points. 
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Figure 5c illustrates the dynamics of capital structure based on the treatment-reversal results in 
column 4 of Table 3. A firm that experiences an increase in its marginal tax benefit increases its 
debt from D to D'. A subsequent decrease in its marginal tax benefit leaves debt unchanged at D'. 
This implies that the flat segment of the total cost function moves up from C to C' so that the kink in 
the marginal cost curve moves up and to the right with each tax increase, forever leaving the firm at 
the kink. Leverage is thus downward sticky and tax increases appear to ratchet it up permanently.  
Of course, firms do cut leverage in practice − though apparently not in response to tax cuts. This 
suggests that reductions in leverage, when they occur, reflect not changes in the marginal tax benefit 
of debt but changes in the marginal cost of debt (e.g., because firms’ debt capacity has changed). 
The apparent irreversibility of tax-induced leverage increases is a novel form of hysteresis that 
has not previously been documented. It implies that tax rises – but not tax cuts – leave permanent 
marks on firms’ capital structures. To test this, we estimate a cross-sectional leverage regression in 
levels, using only the last panel year   for each firm.22 The variables of interest count how many 
tax rises and tax cuts a firm has experienced since the start of our panel in 1990 (or since going 
public, if later). The results, including standard controls and industry-year fixed effects, are as 
follows:  
819,7                          %5.54
_011.0
__003.0016.0173.0018.0
__000.0__010.0
2
1)017.0(
1)001.0(1)002.0()016.0(1)009.0(
1)002.0(1)006.0(







obs No.R
spreaddefault
booktomarketsizeytangibilitROA
cutstaxnumberincreasestaxnumberleverage
jti
ii-1ii
iii



 
The estimates confirm that the echoes of past tax increases (but not of tax cuts) can still be felt 
in today’s capital structures: All else equal, a firm’s leverage is one percentage point higher for 
every tax increase it has experienced since 1990 or going public (p=0.064). Interestingly, this point 
                                                          
22 To ensure firms were able to react to tax increases during their time in our panel, we restrict the sample to firms that 
are neither in financial distress nor have a junk credit rating. 
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estimate is nearly identical to the treatment effects estimated in Table 3. We discuss possible 
explanations for why firms may respond asymmetrically to tax changes in the conclusions.  
5.4 Pre-trends and Drift 
Column 5 of Table 3 considers the timing of the effect of tax rises on leverage. As in the 
corresponding univariate results shown in Figure 4, we see that firms increase leverage with a one-
year lag rather than contemporaneously. There is little sign of a reversal two years after a tax 
increase (nor in subsequent years; not shown), indicating that the increase in leverage that follows a 
tax increase is persistent. (We already know that not even a subsequent tax cut will reverse it.) 
To test for pre-trends, column 5 also includes two leads. Their coefficients are fairly small (at –
7.6 and –41 basis points) and far from statistically significant. This has three important implications. 
First, pre-trends do not differ significantly between treated and control firms. This is important for 
identification, since diff-in-diff estimators attribute any differences in trends between treated and 
control firms that coincide with the tax change to that tax change. So if treated and control firms 
started off on different trends, estimates could be biased. Second, the absence of significant lead 
effects means that treated firms do not anticipate future tax changes. One interpretation of this is 
that even if firms know about tax increases in advance, they do not increase leverage before they 
can actually reap the benefits of the increased tax shield. Third, the fact that leverage increases only 
after tax rises suggests that this relation is not the result of state lawmakers simply responding to 
deteriorating economic conditions (an omitted variable) or increases in leverage (reverse causality). 
Instead, we see firms reacting only once they can take advantage of the increased tax shields. 
Finally, we explore whether the failure to respond to tax cuts simply reflects delays, perhaps 
caused by adjustment costs incurred in reducing leverage. Such delays would imply that the tax-cut 
coefficient in our earlier regressions understates the full effect of tax cuts on leverage. However, 
this does not appear to be the case: The coefficients for the first four lags of the tax cut indicator are 
tiny at –9, +9, +2, and –12 basis points for a net four-year decrease of only 10 basis points (not 
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shown). Thus, we find no evidence that firms react to tax cuts with any kind of reasonable lag.  
5.5 Robustness  
Table 4 reports key robustness tests. First, to assess possible structural breaks, columns 1 and 2 
partition the sample by decade. This reveals a modest (and insignificant) increase in the sensitivity 
of debt to tax rises over time: The estimated diff-in-diff is 109 basis points in 1990-1999 (p=0.025) 
and 116 basis points after 2000 (p=0.002). Leverage is insensitive to tax cuts in both subsamples, so 
the tax sensitivity is asymmetric throughout our sample period. Because we obtain nearly identical 
results in both periods, our results cannot be driven by any single tax-change event. 
We next investigate if the observed tax sensitivity might be due to unobserved time-invariant 
differences between states. If firms choose where to locate based on unobserved state attributes that 
correlate with their debt policies, we should not compare, say, Michigan firms suffering a tax shock 
to control firms in, say, Utah. The solution is to include state fixed effects alongside the industry-
year effects used in our baseline specification. Column 3 shows the results. Including state fixed 
effects barely changes the sensitivity of leverage to tax rises: The diff-in-diff estimate of 112 basis 
points is only marginally lower than the 114 basis points shown in Table 3 and continues to be 
highly statistically significant (p<0.001). Similarly, tax cuts continue to have no effect on leverage.  
Column 4 includes short-term debt in the dependent variable and so models changes in total 
leverage. Consistent with our conjecture that firms respond to tax changes primarily on the long-
term debt margin rather than by changing short-term debt, we find attenuation in the estimated tax 
sensitivity: On average, firms increase total leverage by 69 basis points in response to a tax rise 
(p=0.016). Even this smaller treatment effect is economically meaningful: Relative to the mean pre-
treatment ratio of 23.3% (Table 2), it represents an increase of 3%. Column 5 excludes short-term 
debt but includes the current portion of long-term debt (due within a year). This has, as we predicted 
earlier, no effect on the estimated treatment effect: On average, firms increase leverage by 115 basis 
points (p<0.001), one basis point more than our baseline estimate in Table 3. As before, we see no 
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sensitivity to tax cuts. Column 6 models long-term market (rather than book) leverage. The point 
estimate for tax rises is 71 basis points (p=0.043) and we continue to find no reaction to tax cuts.  
One potential critique of leverage regressions is that observed variation in leverage may reflect 
spurious changes in the denominator (the market or book value of assets) rather than changes in the 
numerator (outstanding debt). This would especially bias market-leverage regressions, because the 
same factors that cause a firm to adjust leverage (say, changes in union power) could also affect its 
share price. A simple remedy is to model log debt rather than a leverage ratio. The results, shown in 
column 7, confirm our findings: While firms are unresponsive to tax cuts (p=0.256), they increase 
their long-term debt significantly after tax rises (p=0.001), by a sizeable 10.7% on average.  
5.6 Causality  
Are the observed sensitivity of leverage to tax increases and the failure to reduce leverage in 
response to tax cuts plausibly causal? That depends on our ability to rule out the presence of 
confounding effects, i.e., the possibility that omitted variables simultaneously drive state-level 
changes in taxes and firm-level changes in leverage. Because our leverage regressions include 
industry-year effects, we know that our results are not driven by time-varying industry shocks. We 
have also shown that our results hold within-firm (ruling out that they are driven by time-invariant 
firm heterogeneity) and that they are robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects.  
The only remaining type of omitted variable that could confound our results is one that is 
collinear with the dimension of the tax-change treatment. Since the treatment varies within states 
across time, we cannot include state-year fixed effects to remove such a confound directly. In this 
section, we report tests dealing with three leading potential confounds: Changes in local economic 
conditions, changes in local labor market conditions, and changes in a state’s political leanings.  
5.6.1 Potential Confound: Local Business Cycle Effects 
States may change corporate income taxes because of local demand shocks or other changes in 
their economic conditions. To the extent that these economic conditions also affect firms’ debt 
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policies (say, because firms borrow more when their cash flows fall in recessions), the observed 
correlation between tax increases and leverage increases may be spurious. While the preliminary 
results in Table 1 suggest that tax increases are unrelated to state growth and unemployment rates, 
this potential confound nonetheless deserves serious consideration.  
One way to address it is to add controls for state-level economic conditions. Table 5, column 1 
includes lagged changes in GSP growth rates and state unemployment rates and a more direct proxy 
for local demand shocks: The lagged change in a state’s sales growth, measured as the value-
weighted average sales growth rate of all publicly traded firms headquartered in the state.  
The effect of lagged state unemployment rates is positive, consistent with firms borrowing more 
when economic conditions in their home state deteriorate, but it is only marginally significant 
(p=0.077). It is also economically small: A one-standard deviation increase in unemployment is 
associated with only a 17 basis point increase in leverage. Neither lagged GSP growth nor variation 
in the state’s sales growth has a significant effect on leverage. Overall, the inclusion of these state-
level economic conditions leaves the diff-in-diff estimates of tax increases and tax cuts essentially 
unchanged at 111 basis points (p<0.001) and –1.2 basis points (p=0.942), respectively.  
Column 1 suggests that omitting these particular measures of state-level economic conditions 
does not confound the estimated tax sensitivity of debt. A variation on the economic-conditions 
confound is that both firms and states react to omitted regional economic conditions and that some 
important part of this regional variation is orthogonal to our state-level controls for growth, demand, 
and unemployment. To isolate the potential effect of regional conditions, we consider a type of 
falsification test. Column 2 includes indicator variables for tax rises and tax cuts in a bordering 
state. The logic of this test is as follows. Suppose tax changes are driven by omitted changes in 
regional conditions (orthogonal to our state-level controls) and firms respond to these changes 
rather than to tax changes. Then we should see firms apparently “reacting” to a tax change in a 
bordering state (assuming they are exposed to similar economic conditions as the state next door).  
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Column 2 shows that, as before, firms borrow more in response to home-state tax rises and fail 
to cut leverage in response to home-state tax cuts. Consistent with a causal treatment effect, firms 
located in a state that does not change its own tax rate but borders one that does do not mirror this 
behavior. But there is more. When a neighboring state increases taxes, control firms actually reduce 
their leverage, by a significant 31 basis points on average (p=0.029). If firms in neighboring states 
share similar economic conditions, this behavior is hard to reconcile with the conjectured confound. 
Instead, it suggests the presence of a different confound, one that would bias our estimates 
downward: Absent a tax increase, the “normal” reaction to the unobserved change in economic 
conditions appears to be to reduce leverage.  
To explore this further, we present a variation on the bordering-states falsification test. Splitting 
the sample, we compare the debt policies of firms subject to a state-level tax shock to control firms 
headquartered in either a neighboring state (column 3) or in a far-away state (column 4). If variation 
in regional economic conditions rather than tax shocks were the true driver of leverage changes, we 
would expect no significant treatment effects when restricting control firms to be neighbors. 
Again, we find the opposite. Compared to neighboring firms without tax changes, firms increase 
their long-term leverage by 120 basis points when their home state increases corporate income taxes 
(p=0.002). Compared to firms located farther away, they increase their leverage by 91 basis points 
(p=0.003). Thus, narrowing the sample of control firms to those sharing arguably similar (regional) 
economic conditions marginally increases the economic magnitude of the sensitivity of leverage to 
tax increases (though this increase is not statistically significant).  
Of course, firms in neighboring states may not necessarily share the same economic conditions, 
for example if they are located at opposite ends of two large states. We can construct a cleaner test 
by focusing on firms headquartered in adjacent counties either side of a state border, where one firm 
experiences a state income tax change in year t while the other does not. Such county pairs share 
plausibly similar (unobserved) local economic conditions while being subject to different tax 
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treatments. This test is a form of sharp regression discontinuity approach.  
We identify a firm’s county based on its zip code, using a bridge obtained from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.23,24 Our sample contains 345 county-pair/year clusters involving 
firms in adjacent county pairs such that in year t, one or more firms in one county experience a tax 
shock while one or more firms in the adjacent county do not. The total number of treated and 
control firms is 2,047 and because the same firm can be hit with multiple tax shocks over time, 
there are 10,208 firm-years. Of these, 641 involve tax rises in 19 states and 2,289 involve tax cuts in 
22 states. Thus, there is a large number of firms per county-pair/year cluster and there is substantial 
variation in treatment status within each cluster involving a large number of separate tax shocks.  
Column 5 includes two sets of fixed effects:25 A set of county-pair/year fixed effects, to remove 
unobserved variation in economic conditions affecting firms operating in a pair of adjacent 
counties, and the set of industry-year fixed effects we used previously to remove unobserved 
variation in industry conditions that may affect leverage. Economically, column 5 compares the 
change in industry-adjusted leverage of treated and control firms operating in the same location (but 
not necessarily in the same industry), holding covariates constant. 
Interestingly, the estimated sensitivity of leverage to tax increases in column 5 is twice as large 
as that in the Table 3 baseline specification: Relative to control firms just the other side of the state 
border, treated firms increase their (industry-adjusted) leverage by an average of 237 basis points 
(p=0.005) when their home state raises corporate tax rates. This suggests that our simple treatment 
estimates, which use as controls firms from anywhere in the country (Table 3) or from anywhere in 
the neighboring state (Table 5, column 3), are conservative. Once we account for time-varying local 
                                                          
23 Available at http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/sci_data/codes/fips/type_txt/cntyxref.asp. In rare cases, a zip code spans 
two counties, in which case we identify the correct county from a firm’s SEC filings or a google search. 
24 We hand-collect historical zip codes from SEC filings for the 1,532 firms that our data checks indicate moved across 
state lines over our sample period. For the remaining 8,573 sample firms, we use Compustat’s current zip codes. This 
will introduce noise to the extent that these firms moved counties within a state during our sample period. Given the 
large number of firm-years involved (81,926), hand-collecting historic zip codes for these firms is impracticable. 
However, our coefficients are quite precisely estimated, so noise does not appear to be a major concern. 
25 This is estimated using Stata’s reg2hdfe command, which can handle two sets of fixed effects even if the number of 
units in each dimension is large; see Guimaraes and Portugal (2010). 
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economic conditions using adjacent-county-pair/year fixed effects, the tax sensitivity doubles.  
Why is the estimated tax sensitivity so much greater? Unlike previous specifications, column 5 
does not estimate the treatment effect within-industry; instead, it includes two independent sets of 
fixed effects, comparing the change in industry-adjusted leverage of, say, a treated food retailer to 
the contemporaneous change in industry-adjusted leverage of an untreated shoe manufacturer 
(requiring only that both be located in the same county-pair). To see if it is this industry mismatch 
that causes the estimated tax sensitivity to double, column 6 requires controls not only to be located 
in an adjacent county but also to operate in the same SIC4 industry. This is achieved by including 
county-pair/industry/year fixed effects, thus holding constant local industry conditions in year t.  
Requiring neighboring firms to operate in the same industry reduces the sample size by nearly 
90%, to 1,284 firm-years in 410 county-pair/industry/year triplets. Still, the point estimate proves 
remarkably stable. Relative to firms in the same industry located just the other side of a state border, 
treated firms increase their leverage by 254 basis points on average following a tax rise (p=0.009).  
The fact that the estimates in columns 5 and 6 are nearly identical suggests that industry 
mismatches cannot account for the observed increase in tax sensitivity. An alternative explanation is 
that the treated firms in these restricted samples are somehow unusual and thus selected. But that 
appears not to be the case: Treated firms in border counties increase their industry-adjusted leverage 
following a tax rise by an average of 100 basis points, which is actually less than the 141 basis-point 
increase among treated firms in interior counties excluded from our adjacent-counties tests (though 
this difference is not statistically significant (p=0.546)). The upshot is that the increase in tax 
sensitivity must be the result of restricting control firms to be located nearby. In particular, to 
account for the increase, it must be the case that control firms are cutting their leverage relative to 
their industry peers located elsewhere in the country. This dovetails with the significant reduction in 
leverage we see among control firms when a neighboring state raises taxes (see Table 5, column 2). 
What remains after ruling out industry mismatches or selection effects in the restricted treatment 
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samples is a strong, and hitherto unknown, local determinant of firms’ debt policies. Tax rises 
appear to coincide with changes in local conditions that absent a tax change would cause firms to 
cut leverage relative to their industry peers elsewhere in the country. However, this effect is 
masked, among treated firms faced with the same change in local conditions, by an increase in the 
marginal (tax) benefit of debt. Failing to control for variation in local conditions, as our baseline 
models do, underestimates the magnitude of the tax sensitivity by comparing treated firms to 
controls that are mostly located too far away to be affected by the same local conditions. This, in 
turn, implies that tax rises plausibly cause firms to borrow more.  
5.6.2 Potential Confound: Unobserved Changes in Investment Opportunities 
A potential explanation for the asymmetric tax sensitivity is that tax cuts correlate with better 
local investment opportunities26 so that treated firms face two exactly offsetting effects: A reduction 
in the value of tax shields, prompting a cut in debt, and a simultaneous increase in the demand for 
capital, prompting firms to borrow more. If this explanation were true, we should see a “reverse” 
treatment effect: Control firms exposed to the same improvement in local conditions but no change 
in the value of tax shields should increase their leverage. We see no evidence of this in Table 5. 
Whether we compare treated firms to controls headquartered in a neighboring state, focus on firms 
in adjacent-county pairs, or even remove unobserved variation in local industry conditions, we find 
that firms never cut leverage in response to tax cuts. 
5.6.3 Potential Confounds: Union Power and Political Leanings 
We next consider two other potential confounds, starting with labor market conditions. Matsa 
(2010) finds a positive correlation between union power and leverage which he interprets as 
evidence that firms use debt strategically to counter their unions’ bargaining power. If labor market 
forces are a first-order determinant of capital structure choices, what looks like a tax-induced 
change in leverage may in fact be driven by unobserved variation in union power in a given state 
                                                          
26 Recall that the only omitted variables that could confound our tests are those that, like the treatment, vary within state 
across time. Thus, we only need to deal with unobserved local improvements in investment opportunities. 
  
28
which simultaneously causes tax rises and leverage increases.  
To test this, we exploit variation in unionization rates across states and time. Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 6 partition the sample into firms headquartered in states with either high or low union power. 
(See Appendix C for details.) Both sets of firms increase leverage significantly when taxes rise. 
Interestingly, the increase is nearly twice as large among firms located in low-union states, at 141 
versus 80 basis points. This, together with the results in Table 1 showing that tax-increasing states 
are no more unionized than other states, casts doubt on the idea firms borrow more not because of a 
tax rise but to counter union power.  
Titman (1984) argues that firms choose their debt to insure workers against unemployment risk. 
To confound our results, unemployment risk would have to fall at the same time as states increase 
corporate taxes. To the extent that unemployment risk correlates with unemployment rates, the lack 
of correlation between tax changes and state unemployment rates shown in Table 1 suggests our 
tests are unlikely to be confounded in this way. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we conduct a direct 
test, partitioning the sample into firms headquartered in states that suffer either large or small 
employment shocks at the time of a tax rise. (See Appendix C for definitions.) We observe a 
positive and significant tax sensitivity in both groups, averaging 121 and 99 basis points, 
respectively. Thus, firms increase their leverage in response to tax rises regardless of whether their 
state has suffered a large employment shock. 
Our third potential confound concerns political economy factors. Table 1 showed that states that 
lean Democratic are significantly more likely to raise corporate income taxes. To examine if this 
might lead to a spurious correlation between tax rises and leverage increases, columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 6 partition the sample into firms that are headquartered in states leaning Democratic or 
Republican, respectively. While larger in Democratic states, we find no evidence that the sensitivity 
of leverage to tax increases varies significantly with the political leanings of a firm’s home state.  
Throughout these models, we continue to find that the tax sensitivity of leverage is asymmetric. 
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5.7 Potential Measurement Error: Location of Operations and Sales 
Firms are taxed wherever they operate. To the extent that sample firms have operations outside 
the state in which they are headquartered, our leverage regressions thus underestimate the 
sensitivity of debt to taxes. Put differently, the tax sensitivity we estimate is the weighted average 
response to tax changes given the geographic distribution of firms’ operations. It will be lower if a 
firm also operates in states that experience no tax changes. While less of a problem for tax 
increases, measurement error could potentially explain the observed lack of sensitivity to tax cuts. 
To illustrate that our estimates represent lower bounds, Table 7 partitions sample firms into 
multinationals and domestic firms. Consistent with the prediction that multinationals are less 
sensitive to changes in state taxes than domestic firms, as part of their tax base is abroad, we find 
that only domestic firms respond to tax increases. While the diff-in-diff estimate for multinationals 
is an insignificant 28 basis points (p=0.505), it is more than five times greater, at 152 basis points, 
for domestic firms (p=0.001). The difference in point estimates is statistically significant (p=0.026). 
This is consistent with our conjecture that unobserved heterogeneity in the geographic location of 
firms’ taxable operations biases the estimated sensitivity to tax increases downward. By contrast, 
neither domestic nor multinational firms cut their leverage in response to tax cuts. Thus, 
measurement error does not appear to be the cause of the observed asymmetry in tax sensitivity. 
We next test if unobserved heterogeneity in where firms generate their sales attenuates the 
estimated tax sensitivity. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2012), we partition firms based on whether 
sales in their NAICS3 industry are predominantly inter-state or intra-state. Firms in industries 
shipping predominantly outside their home state should respond less to state tax changes than firms 
selling predominantly in their home state. As columns 3 and 4 show, the data support this 
prediction. Firms in industries that ship mostly out-of-state do not increase leverage significantly 
when their home state increases corporate income taxes, while firms in industries that tend to sell 
mostly within-state do. The point estimates are 37 and 121 basis points, respectively, and the 
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difference is significant at the 10% level. Again, neither group of firms responds to tax cuts. 
5.8 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Interest tax shields depend on the interplay between personal taxes on interest income (i) and 
income from equity (e) on the one hand and corporate taxes on profits (c) on the other. The 
standard textbook tax benefit of debt can be written as      Deci   111 , where D denotes 
the level of debt. Let the (net) cost of debt be represented by a generic quadratic function 
2cDbDa  . The first-order condition for the optimal debt level *D  then is )1(
2
1*
e
c cd
dD   . 
Thus, higher personal taxes on equity income dampen the impact of a corporate tax change on debt. 
Because e likely varies in the cross-section,27 treatment effects should be heterogeneous.  
e cannot be measured directly: Not only does it depend on whether a firm’s marginal investor is 
a tax-exempt institution or a wealthy individual subject to the top income tax rate. It also varies 
across firms as a function of the relative importance of dividend income and capital gains (the latter 
being taxed at a lower effective rate since they can be deferred and/or offset against capital losses).  
This discussion suggests a useful validation test. If the observed tax sensitivity of debt is causal, 
we expect stronger effects among firms with small e. To test this comparative static, Table 8 
considers two proxies for e: Dividends and institutional ownership. Non-dividend payers have 
lower e than dividend-payers because their investors derive their equity income solely in the form 
of (lower-taxed) capital gains. And firms that are predominantly owned by institutions have lower e 
than those predominantly owned by retail investors, as institutions are often tax-exempt.  
When we split the samples accordingly, we find results consistent with heterogeneous treatment 
effects. While non-dividend payers increase leverage by 155 basis points after a tax rise (p<0.001), 
dividend payers increase leverage by only 39 basis points (p=0.411); the difference between these 
                                                          
27 We know from the regressions reported in Table 1 that time-series variation in state taxes on personal income and 
capital gains is unrelated to state corporate income tax changes. Thus, here we focus on cross-sectional variation. 
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point estimates is statistically significant (p=0.034). The ownership test shows qualitatively similar 
results: Firms with large institutional holdings increase leverage by 142 basis points (p=0.008) 
while firms with large retail holdings increase leverage by 84 basis points (p=0.231).  
A corollary of a causal interpretation is that the tax sensitivity of debt should vary with profits, 
as interest-bearing debt offers valuable tax shields only to profitable firms. Columns 5 and 6 
partition sample firms according to whether or not they are profitable in the year of the tax rise.28 
Consistent with firms borrowing to take advantage of tax shields, we find that only profitable firms 
borrow more: When faced with higher taxes in their home state, profitable firms increase leverage 
by 113 basis points (p<0.001), nine times more than the estimated diff-in-diff increase of 12 basis 
points for loss-making firms (p=0.897); the difference is marginally significant (p=0.068).29  
Trade-off theory suggests that the extent to which a firm can increase its leverage in response to 
a tax rise depends on its debt capacity and its likely costs of distress (as captured by c above). 
Effectively, its default risk acts as a constraint on its ability to take advantage of further tax shields 
of debt. To test this prediction, we partition firms into those rated investment-grade (column 7) and 
those rated junk by S&P, Moody’s, or Fitch (column 8). Firms without a credit rating are omitted. 
We find that investment-grade firms increase their leverage by 126 basis points (p=0.018) following 
a tax rise, whereas riskier borrowers do not increase their leverage at all (p=0.946).  
Overall, these patterns support a causal interpretation of the observed tax sensitivity of debt.  
6. Conclusions 
The U.S. tax system subsidizes firms’ use of debt: Interest payments are tax deductible while 
retained earnings and dividends are not. Despite decades of scholarship, it is an open question 
whether taxes are a first-order determinant of capital structure. We overcome the identification 
challenges that have hampered previous work by using a natural experiment in the form of 
                                                          
28 Alternatively, we could condition on marginal tax rates (MTR). While MTR cannot be directly observed, Graham 
(1996b) and Graham and Mills (2008) provide useful simulations. Using their simulated MTRs, we find qualitatively 
similar (albeit considerably noisier) results. 
29 Though not reported, we find statistically stronger results if we partition firms based on whether they were profitable 
or loss-making in every year between t = –2 and t = 0 (p=0.043), which may be a better predictor of future profitability.  
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staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states. Our results show that firms react 
strongly to tax increases but are insensitive to tax cuts. These findings are robust to various potential 
confounds. Finally, we find evidence of geographic clustering in corporate debt policies.  
The asymmetry in tax sensitivity we observe in the data runs counter to standard trade-off 
theory. It suggests that leverage is sticky on the downside, in the sense that tax increases ratchet up 
leverage permanently while tax cuts do not subsequently reduce it. What could explain this 
hysteresis? After all, it is surprising that firms appear quite happy to increase leverage (which 
increases bankruptcy risk) but reluctant to cut it in response to changes in the tax benefit of debt. 
Unless the firm wishes to shrink its balance sheet, reducing leverage involves either issuing 
equity or cutting the dividend. Thus, one possible explanation for the lack of response to tax cuts is 
that managers are simply reluctant to issue equity (consistent with pecking-order arguments) or to 
cut the dividend (to avoid the negative share price reaction that typically results). Another is that 
firms face some kind of adjustment costs as in Leary and Roberts (2005). 
Alternatively, tax cuts could operate on two margins simultaneously: Reducing the marginal tax 
benefit while increasing the after-tax return on investment and so inducing firms to undertake more 
(debt-financed) investment. We are skeptical of this story, for three reasons. First, our regression-
discontinuity tests do not support it. Second, the argument should apply in reverse to tax rises, so 
why would the two effects exactly offset each other for tax cuts but not for tax rises? Third, Asker, 
Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011) find that publicly traded firms (such as the ones in our sample) 
do not increase investment in response to either tax cuts or tax rises. 
In a policy paper dealing with the problems of bank recapitalization, Admati et al. (2012) 
suggest a third possible explanation: Shareholders may be reluctant to reduce leverage because the 
benefit flows primarily to creditors as the remaining debt becomes safer. Such a debt overhang 
problem could potentially explain why we find an asymmetric tax sensitivity. We leave further 
analysis of the causes of hysteresis in leverage to future research. 
  
33
References 
Admati, Anat R., Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer, 2012, Debt overhang 
and capital regulation, Working Paper, Stanford University. 
Agrawal, Ashwini K., and David A. Matsa, 2012, Labor unemployment risk and corporate 
financing decisions, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Asker, John, Joan Farre-Mensa, and Alexander Ljungqvist, 2011, Comparing the investment 
behavior of public and private firms, Working Paper, New York University. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004, How much should we trust 
differences-in-differences estimates?, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-275. 
van Binsbergen, Jules, John R. Graham, and Jie Yang, 2010, The cost of debt, Journal of Finance 
65, 2089-2136. 
Booth, Laurence, Varouj A. Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2001, 
Capital structures in developing countries, Journal of Finance 56, 87-130. 
Brealey, Richard, Stewart Myers, and Franklin Allen, 2011, Principles of Corporate Finance (10th 
ed.), McGraw-Hill. 
Faccio, Mara, and Jin Xu, 2011, Taxes and capital structure, Working Paper, Purdue University. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1998, Taxes, financing decisions, and firm value, Journal 
of Finance 53, 819-843. 
Foley, C. Fritz, Jay Hartzell, Sheridan Titman, and Garry Twite, 2007, Why do firms hold so much 
cash? A tax-based explanation, Journal of Financial Economics 86, 579-607. 
Frank, Murray Z., and Vidhan K. Goyal, 2009, Capital structure decisions: Which factors are 
reliably important?, Financial Management 38, 1-37. 
Givoly, Dan, Carla Hahn, Aharon R. Ofer, and Oded H. Sarig, 1992, Taxes and capital structure: 
Evidence from firms’ responses to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Review of Financial Studies 5, 
331-355. 
Gordon, Roger H., and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, 1991, Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on 
corporate financial policy and organizational form, NBER Working Paper No. 3222. 
Gormley, Todd A., and David A. Matsa, 2012, Common errors: How to (and not to) control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Graham, John R., 1996a, Debt and the marginal tax rate, Journal of Financial Economics 41, 41-73. 
Graham, John R., 1996b, Proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate, Journal of Financial 
Economics 42, 187-221. 
Graham, John R., 2008, Taxes and corporate finance, in Espen Eckbo (ed.), Handbook of Empirical 
Corporate Finance (vol. 2), Elsevier. 
Graham, John R., and Lillian Mills, 2008, Simulating marginal tax rates using tax return data, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 366-388. 
Guimaraes, Paulo, and Pedro Portugal, 2010, A simple feasible alternative procedure to estimate 
models with high-dimensional fixed effects, Stata Journal 10, 628-649.  
  
34
Hirsch, Barry T., and David A. Macpherson, 2003, Union membership and coverage database from 
the Current Population Survey: Note, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56, 349-54. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate financing, and takeovers, 
American Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
Kraus, Alan, and Robert H. Litzenberger, 1973, A state-preference model of optimal financial 
leverage, Journal of Finance 28, 911-922. 
Leary, Mark T., and Michael R. Roberts, 2005, Do firms rebalance their capital structures?, Journal 
of Finance 60, 2575-2619. 
Lin, Leming, and Mark Flannery, 2012, Do personal taxes affect capital structure: Evidence from 
the 2003 tax cut, Working Paper, University of Florida. 
MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 1990, Do taxes affect capital structure decisions?, Journal of Finance 
45, 1471-1493. 
Matsa, David A., 2010, Capital structure as a strategic variable: Evidence from collective 
bargaining, Journal of Finance 65, 1197-1232. 
Miller, Merton H., 1977, Debt and taxes, Journal of Finance 32, 261-275. 
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller, 1963, Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A 
correction, American Economic Review 53, 433-443. 
Myers, Stewart C., 1977, Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5, 
147-175. 
Myers, Stewart C., 1984, The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 39, 575-592. 
Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 1995, What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data, Journal of Finance 50, 1421-1460. 
Titman, Sheridan, 1984, The effect of capital structure on a firm’s liquidation decision, Journal of 
Financial Economics 13, 137-151. 
  
35
Appendix A. List of State Corporate Tax Increases.  
This table lists all state corporate tax increases over the period 1990-2011. In states with more than one tax bracket, 
we report the change to the top bracket. To identify these changes, we use data obtained from the Tax Foundation 
(an abbreviated version of which is available at http://www.taxfoundation.org) and a search of the “Current 
Corporate Income Tax Developments” feature published periodically in the Journal of State Taxation. We verify all 
information using each state’s Department of Revenue and State Legislature websites. 
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample 
firms 
KY 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7.25% to 8% 13 
MO 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6.5% 53 
MT 1990 Introduction of 5% tax surcharge on tax liability 3 
NE 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6.65% to 7.24% 10 
OK 1990 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6% 45 
AR 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6% to 6.5% 17 
ME 1991 Introduction of 10% tax surcharge on tax liability 4 
NC 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 7.75% and introduction of 4% tax surcharge 
on tax liability 
60 
NE 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7.24% to 7.81% and introduction of 15% tax 
surcharge on tax liability 
10 
PA 1991 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 12.25% 165 
RI 1991 Introduction of 11%% tax surcharge on tax liability 10 
WI 1991 Introduction of 5.5% tax surcharge on tax liability 60 
KS 1992 Increase in top corporate income tax rate (including surcharge) from 6.75% to 7.35% 21 
MT 1992 Re-introduction of tax surcharge on tax liability at 2.3% rate 2 
MO 1993 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6.25% 68 
MT 1993 Increase in tax surcharge on tax liability from 2.3% to 4.7% 4 
VT 1997 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8.25% to 9.75% 9 
NH 1999 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 8% 19 
AL 2001 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 6.5% 24 
NH 2001 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 8.5% 18 
CA 2002 Suspension of state net operating loss (NOL) deduction, affecting profitable firms that have tax 
loss carryovers for California state income tax purposes 
148 
IA 2002 Introduction of 2.5% tax surcharge 17 
KS 2002 Increase in tax surcharge on taxable income from 3.35% to 4.5% 19 
KY 2002 Introduction of 3.35% tax surcharge on income > $50,000 23 
NJ 2002 Introduction of Alternative Minimum Assessment tax, under which firms pay the greater of a 
gross receipts tax and the corporate franchise (net income) tax; suspension of NOL deduction 
175 
TN 2002 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6% to 6.5% 51 
AR 2003 Introduction of 3% tax surcharge on tax liability 15 
CT 2003 Introduction of 20% tax surcharge on tax liability 87 
IN 2003 Repeal of gross income tax (based on revenue rather than profits) and of supplemental income tax; 
effective adjusted gross income tax rate (on profits) increased from 7.75% to 8.5% 
35 
CT 2004 Increase in tax surcharge on tax liability to 25%  85 
NJ 2006 Introduction of 4% tax surcharge on tax liability 149 
MD 2008 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 8.25% 58 
MI 2008 Introduction of corporate income tax with a top rate of 4.95%; replaces a gross-receipts tax 
without interest deductibility 
54 
CT 2009 Introduction of 10% tax surcharge on tax liability for companies with revenues > $100m 47 
NC 2009 Introduction of 3% tax surcharge on tax liability 60 
OR 2009 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 6.6% to 7.9% 26 
CT 2011 Unscheduled two-year extension of tax surcharge on tax liability and increase to 20% 49 
IL 2011 Increase in top corporate income tax rate from 7.3% to 9.5% 111 
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Appendix B. List of State Corporate Tax Cuts.  
This table lists all state corporate tax cuts over the period 1990-2011. In states with more than one tax bracket, we 
report the change to the top bracket. To identify these changes, we use data obtained from the Tax Foundation (an 
abbreviated version of which is available at http://www.taxfoundation.org) and a search of the “Current Corporate 
Income Tax Developments” feature published periodically in the Journal of State Taxation. We verify all 
information using each state’s Department of Revenue and State Legislature websites. 
 
State Year Description 
No. of 
affected 
sample 
firms 
AZ 1990 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.5% to 9.3% 44 
WV 1990 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.525% to 9.375% 7 
MN 1991 Reduction in the legislated tax increase of 0.4% 146 
MT 1991 Repeal of 5% tax surcharge 2 
WV 1991 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.3% to 9.15% 6 
MO 1992 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 6.5% to 5% 61 
WV 1992 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.15% to 9% 6 
DC 1993 Reduction in tax surcharge from 5% to 2.5% 8 
ME 1993 Repeal of 10% tax surcharge 5 
NE 1993 Repeal of 15% tax surcharge 12 
AZ 1994 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.3% to 9% 56 
MT 1994 Repeal of 4.7% tax surcharge 3 
NJ 1994 Repeal of 0.375% tax surcharge 221 
NY 1994 Reduction in tax surcharge from 15% to 10% 434 
PA 1994 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 12.25% to 11.99% 200 
RI 1994 Repeal of 11% tax surcharge 23 
CT 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 11.5% to 11.25% 125 
DC 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10% to 9.50% 8 
NH 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.5% to 7% 20 
NY 1995 Repeal of 10% tax surcharge 435 
PA 1995 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 11.99% to 9.99% 202 
CT 1996 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 11.25% to 10.75% 135 
CA 1997 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.3% to 8.84% 942 
CT 1997 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.75% to 10.50% 138 
NC 1997 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.75% to 7.5% 82 
AZ 1998 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9% to 8% 70 
CT 1998 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.5% to 9.50% 123 
NC 1998 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.5% to 7.25% 83 
WI 1998 Reduction in tax surcharge from 5.5% to 2.75% 64 
CO 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 5% to 4.75% 140 
CT 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.5% to 8.50% 111 
NC 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.25% to 7% 76 
NY 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9% to 8.5% 365 
OH 1999 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.9% to 8.5% 148 
AZ 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.968% 65 
CO 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 4.75% to 4.63% 127 
CT 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 7.50% 102 
NC 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 6.9% 72 
NY 2000 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.5% to 8% 381 
AZ 2001 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.968% to 6.968% 55 
ID 2001 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.6% 8 
NY 2001 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8% to 7.5% 325 
IA 2003 Repeal of 2.5% tax surcharge 17 
KS 2003 Reduction in tax surcharge from 4.5% to 3.35% 20 
KY 2003 Repeal of 3.35% tax surcharge 22 
ND 2004 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 10.5% to 7% 1 
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AR 2005 Repeal of 3% tax surcharge 14 
KY 2005 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.25% to 7% 19 
OH 2005 Tax reform phasing out corp. income tax while phasing in gross receipts tax over period of 5 years 102 
CT 2006 Reduction in tax surcharge from 25% to 20% 74 
VT 2006 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.75% to 8.9% 2 
KY 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 6% 17 
ND 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7% to 6.5% 0 
NY 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.5% to 7.1% 261 
VT 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.9% to 8.5% 2 
WV 2007 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9% to 8.75% 6 
CT 2008 Repeal of 20% tax surcharge 69 
KS 2008 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3.35% to 3.15% 17 
TX 2008 Abolition of income tax, replaced with gross receipts tax 300 
KS 2009 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3.15% to 3.05% 16 
ND 2009 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 6.5% to 6.4% 1 
WV 2009 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.75% to 8.5% 5 
MA 2010 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 9.5% to 8.75% 160 
NJ 2010 Repeal of 4% tax surcharge 98 
KS 2011 Reduction in tax surcharge from 3.05% to 3% 8 
MA 2011 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 8.75% to 8.25% 129 
OR 2011 Reduction in top corporate income tax rate from 7.9% to 7.6% 25 
      
 
 
  
38
Appendix C. Variable Definitions.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
Long-term book leverage is defined as long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) over the book value of assets 
(Compustat item at).  
 
Long-term book leverage (including current portion of long-term debt) is defined as the sum of long-term debt 
(Compustat item dltt) and long-term debt due in one year (Compustat item dd1), over the book value of assets 
(Compustat item at). 
 
Total book leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) and short-term debt (Compustat 
item dlc), over the book value of assets (Compustat item at). 
 
Market leverage is defined as long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) over the sum of long-term debt and the fiscal-
year-end share price (Compustat item prcc_f) times the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat item 
csho). 
 
Log long-term debt is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus long-term debt (Compustat item dltt), deflated to 
2005 dollars using the GDP deflator available at http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls. 
 
Independent variables: State-level characteristics 
 
State GSP growth rate is the real annual growth rate in gross state product (GSP) using data obtained from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
State unemployment rate is the state unemployment rate, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Vote share of Democratic Presidential candidate is the share of the vote cast by voters in the state for the 
Democratic candidate in the most recent Presidential election before year t, and zero otherwise. Election data come 
from the American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). 
 
State union membership is the fraction of private-sector employees in a state who belong to a labor union in year t. 
The data come from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) as updated on their website, www.unionstats.com. 
 
State sales growth is the value-weighted mean sales growth among publicly traded firms headquartered in a state, 
constructed from Compustat data for sales growth and weighted by firms’ market values of equity [prcc_f*csho]. 
 
State tax on wages is the maximum state tax rate on wage income, estimated for an additional $1,000 of income on 
an initial $1,500,000 of wage income (split evenly between husband and wife). The taxpayer is assumed to be 
married and filing jointly. The data come from Daniel Feenberg, available at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-
rates/. 
 
State tax on long-term capital gains is the maximum state tax rate on long-term capital gains. The data come from 
Daniel Feenberg, available at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/. 
 
Independent variables: Firm-level characteristics 
 
ROA (return on assets) is defined as operating income before depreciation (Compustat item oibdp) over the book 
value of assets (Compustat item at). 
 
Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat item at) in year 2005 real dollars (deflated 
using the GDP deflator available at http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls). 
 
Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item ppent), over the book value of assets 
(Compustat item at). 
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Market/book is constructed as in Frank and Goyal (2009). It is defined as (fiscal year-end closing price [prcc_f] 
times common shares used to calculate earnings per share [cshpri] + the liquidation value of preferred stock [pstkl] + 
long-term debt [dltt] + short-term debt [dlc] – deferred taxes and investment tax credits [txditc]) / total assets [at]. 
 
Independent variables: Credit market conditions 
 
Default spread is the difference between the yield on Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds, measured as of the firm’s 
fiscal-year month end. The data are obtained from the Federal Reserve’s H15 Report, accessed through WRDS. 
 
Conditioning variables 
 
Firms in bordering states are firms headquartered in states that border a state that changes its corporate income tax 
but that do not themselves change their corporate income taxes at the same time.  
 
Firms in far-away states are firms that are headquartered two or more states away from a state that changes its 
corporate income tax.  
 
States with high union power is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that ranks in the 
top third of states according to the fraction of private-sector employees who belong to a labor union in year t, and 
zero otherwise. The data come from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) as updated on their website, 
www.unionstats.com. 
 
States with low union power is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that ranks in the 
bottom third of states according to the fraction of private-sector employees who belong to a labor union in year t, 
and zero otherwise.  
 
States suffering large employment shocks is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that 
ranks in the top third of states according to the fraction of private-sector employees (measured as of year t-1) who 
lose their jobs in a mass layoff event in year t, and zero otherwise. The data come the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Mass Layoff Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/mls/#tables) and are available only for the period from 1996.  
 
States suffering no large employment shocks is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state 
that ranks in the bottom third of states according to the fraction of private-sector employees (measured as of year t-
1) who lose their jobs in a mass layoff event in year t, and zero otherwise.  
 
States leaning Democratic is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that voted for the 
Democratic candidate in the most recent Presidential election before year t, and zero otherwise. Election data come 
from the American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). 
 
States leaning Republican is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that voted for the 
Republican candidate in the most recent Presidential election before year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
Multinational is constructed as in Foley et al. (2007). It is an indicator set equal to 1 if the firm reports paying 
foreign income taxes (Compustat variable txfo non-zero and non-missing) or reports having foreign income 
(Compustat variable pifo non-zero and non-missing), and zero otherwise. 
 
Domestic firm is an indicator set equal to 1 if multinational equals 0, and vice versa. 
 
High inter-state sales is constructed using data from Agrawal and Matsa (2012). Agrawal and Matsa use data from 
the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) to calculate, for each three-digit NAICS industry covered by the CFS, the 
fraction of shipments (by value) that stay within-state (“intra-state sales”) rather than leave the state (“inter-state 
sales”). Using these data, we construct an indicator set equal to 1 for industries whose inter-state sales exceed the 
67th percentile, and zero otherwise.  
 
Low inter-state sales is an indicator set equal to 1 for industries whose inter-state sales are below the 33rd percentile, 
and zero otherwise.  
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Non-dividend payers are firms with zero dividends on common stock (Compustat item dvc) and on preferred stock 
(Compustat item dvp).  
 
Dividend payers are firms with non-zero dividends on either common stock (Compustat item dvc) or preferred stock 
(Compustat item dvp).  
 
High institutional ownership is an indicator set equal to 1 if the fraction of the firm’s outstanding shares that are 
held by institutional investors filing 13f reports (according to Thomson Reuters) exceeds the 67th percentile, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
High retail ownership is an indicator set equal to 1 if the fraction of the firm’s outstanding shares that are held by 
institutional investors filing 13f reports (according to Thomson Reuters) is below the 33rd percentile, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
Profitable is an indicator set equal to 1 if ROA is strictly positive, and zero otherwise. 
 
Loss-making is an indicator set equal to 1 if ROA is weakly negative, and zero otherwise. 
 
Investment grade is an indicator set equal to 1 if in year t, the firm has an investment-grade rating from S&P, 
Moody’s, or Fitch, using data obtained from Compustat (variable splticrm) and Mergent FISD, and zero otherwise. 
It is missing for firms without a credit rating. 
 
Below-investment grade is an indicator set equal to 1 if investment grade equals 0, and vice versa. 
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Figure 1. Ideal Experiment and Identification Challenges. 
Figure 1a illustrates the standard argument of trade-off theory: Firms choose the level of debt that maximizes the 
difference between the tax benefit of debt and the net cost of debt. At the optimal debt level D*, the marginal tax 
benefit equals the marginal net cost. The tax benefit of debt depends on the corporate tax rate (c), the personal tax 
rate on income from debt (i), and the personal tax rate on income from equity (e). Figure 1b illustrates the ideal 
experiment. Different tax rates (MB1, MB2, MB3,…, MBn) are randomly assigned to firms and the resulting debt 
choices (D1, D2, D3,…, Dn) are recorded. The random assignment ensures that differences in debt levels cannot be 
the result of unobserved heterogeneity across firms. It is as if there was a single firm whose marginal cost curve 
(MC) is traced out by exogenous shifts in the marginal tax benefit. Figure 1c illustrates the identifying assumption 
for observational data. When comparing two (groups of) firms i and j that differ in their effective tax rates, 
identification requires that both (groups of) firms share the same marginal cost, MCi = MCj. Figure 1d illustrates the 
identification challenge. Two firms i and j can have different levels of debt even if taxes provide no marginal benefit 
(the null hypothesis), as long as they differ in their marginal costs (a violation of the identifying assumption). 
 
 Figure 1a: Trade-off theory Figure 1b: The ideal experiment 
 
    
 
 Tax benefit = [(1–i) – (1–c)(1–e)]D 
 Net cost = a + bD + cD2 
 
 
 
 Figure 1c: Identifying assumption for  Figure 1d: Identification challenge 
 observational data 
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Figure 2. Geography of State Corporate Income Tax Changes, 1990-2011. 
 
 Tax increases, 1990-1994 Tax cuts, 1990-1994 
   
 Tax increases, 1995-1999 Tax cuts, 1995-1999 
  
 Tax increases, 2000-2004  Tax cuts, 2000-2004 
   
 Tax increases, 2005-2009  Tax cuts, 2005-2009 
   
 Tax increases, 2010-2011  Tax cuts, 2010-2011 
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Figure 3. Firm-years with Incorrect HQ State Information in Compustat.  
Compustat reports a firm’s current (as opposed to historic) headquarter state. Based on manual corrections using 
regulatory filings, the figure shows the fraction of non-financial and non-utility companies in the U.S. each year 
whose headquarters are located in a different state than the one reported by Compustat, for two downloads: One 
dated August 2010 (covering fiscal years 1990-2009) and another dated May 2012 (covering fiscal years 2010-
2011). In the May 2012 download, Compustat frequently fails to record firms’ headquarter states altogether, 
accounting for the higher error rate.  
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Figure 4. Annual Changes in Leverage Around State Tax Increases and State Tax Cuts. 
The figures plot the average annual within-firm change in long-term leverage for each year in a five-year window 
centered on the year a state increases or cuts its corporate income tax (year 0) for treated firms (striped bars) and 
controls (dotted bars). The difference between the two bars in a given year is the difference-in-difference estimate. 
The significance of t-tests of the null that the diff-in-diff is zero is indicated using asterisks. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The influence of time-varying changes 
in industry conditions (and nation-wide variation in business conditions that affect all industries simultaneously) is 
removed via industry-year fixed effects. To screen out firms with negative equity (distressed firms), we require that 
leverage be less than 1. 
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Figure 5. Asymmetric Tax Sensitivity, Leverage Hysteresis, and the Cost of Debt. 
Figure 5a shows how our natural experiment helps trace out the marginal-cost-of-debt curve for the average firm. 
There are two treatments (tax increases and tax cuts) and one set of control firms (labeled “no change” and “NC” in 
the figure). The three clouds of dots represent the two treatment groups and the controls, respectively. Firms treated 
with a tax increase (TI) increase their leverage from E[D|NC] to E[D|TI] on average, whereas firms treated with a 
tax cut (TC) do not adjust their leverage such that E[D|TC]=E[D|NC] on average. The marginal-cost-of-debt curve is 
therefore positively sloped above the pre-treatment level of debt and infinitely sloped below the pre-treatment level 
of debt. Figure 5b illustrates the implication of this asymmetry in tax sensitivity for the standard trade-off theory of 
capital structure (Figure 1a). Given the marginal cost curve in Figure 5a, the total net cost is upward sloping and 
convex above the optimal level of debt but flat below it. Figure 5c illustrates treatment reversals. Before the tax 
increase, the firm’s debt is at D, the point that gives the largest difference between the dashed Tax Benefit 1 line and 
the dashed Net Cost curve (whose flat segment intersects the y-axis at C). After the tax increase, the firm’s debt 
increases to D', the point at which the difference between the solid Tax Benefit 2 line and the solid Net Cost curve is 
largest. A subsequent tax cut returns the firm’s tax benefit to the dashed Tax Benefit 1 line, but the firm’s debt 
remains at D'. This implies that the flat segment of the total net cost curve has shifted up from C to C'. Note that D' 
gives the largest difference between Tax Benefit 1 and the solid Net Cost curve. Leverage is downward sticky and 
tax shocks ratchet it up irreversibly. As a result, leverage is path-dependent. 
 
 
 Figure 5a: Tracing out the marginal cost Figure 5b: The modified cost of debt 
 curve empirically 
 
   
 
 
 Figure 5c: Leverage hysteresis 
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Table 1. Determinants of State Corporate Income Tax Changes, 1990-2011.  
We relate the probability that a state increases (column 1) or decreases (column 2) its corporate income taxes to the 
state’s lagged growth rate in real gross state product and its lagged unemployment rate; the share of the state’s votes 
going to the Democratic Presidential candidate in the most recent Presidential election; the percentage of private-
sector workers in the state who are union members; and changes in the state’s taxes on wage income and long-term 
capital gains. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. We estimate linear 
probability models with state and year fixed effects. The fixed effects are not shown for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We 
use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
  Tax Tax 
 increase cut 
  (1) (2) 
   
Economic conditions   
   lagged GSP growth rate 0.022 0.491* 
 0.308 0.268 
   lagged state unemployment rate 0.001 0.010 
 0.006 0.007 
Political conditions   
   vote share of Democratic Presidential candidate 0.629*** -0.253 
 0.235 0.213 
Union power   
   lagged state union penetration 0.001 0.001 
 0.006 0.009 
Personal taxation   
   lagged change in state taxes on wages -0.019 -0.010 
 0.014 0.033 
   lagged change in state taxes on long-term capital gains -0.006 -0.005 
 0.006 0.008 
   
Diagnostics   
R2  11.6% 13.3% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 3.0*** 2.3*** 
No. of states (including DC) 51 51 
No. of state-years 1,122 1,122 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
The sample consists of 91,172 firm-years for all non-financial and non-utility U.S. companies that are traded on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq over the period 
1989-2011, as per the merged CRSP-Compustat Fundamentals Annual database. The table reports summary statistics for our dependent variables and the 
controls. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. Return on assets, tangibility, firm size, and market/book are winsorized 0.5% 
in each tail.  
 
  All firm-years (N = 91,172)   
One year before a 
tax increase   
One year before a 
tax cut 
  percentile  (N=1,725)  (N=6,506) 
  mean s.d. 25th 50th 75th   mean s.d.   mean s.d. 
            
Firm leverage            
   long-term debt / assets 0.172 0.264 0.002 0.101 0.275  0.182 0.216  0.171 0.209 
   long-term debt (incl. current portion) / assets 0.198 0.295 0.007 0.133 0.311  0.207 0.227  0.191 0.221 
   (short-term and long-term debt) / assets 0.226 0.311 0.019 0.174 0.349  0.233 0.234  0.218 0.228 
   long-term debt / market value of assets 0.215 0.239 0.010 0.130 0.348  0.240 0.247  0.205 0.226 
            
Long-term debt ($m) 383.9 2,500.4 0.1 6.9 116.9  574.2 3,270.6  377.0 1,802.5 
            
State characteristics            
   GSP growth rate 0.029 0.026 0.012 0.029 0.046  0.014 0.018  0.033 0.024 
   state unemployment rate 0.058 0.017 0.046 0.054 0.066  0.054 0.017  0.059 0.017 
   vote share of Democratic Presidential candidate 0.489 0.073 0.438 0.486 0.534  0.515 0.062  0.504 0.070 
   state union membership 0.097 0.045 0.056 0.097 0.131  0.102 0.035  0.115 0.046 
   state sales growth rate 0.189 0.183 0.094 0.155 0.232  0.121 0.116  0.184 0.130 
            
Firm characteristics            
   ROA 0.034 0.273 0.009 0.104 0.166  0.055 0.243  0.046 0.256 
   total assets ($m) 1,676.5 9,530.2 34.1 134.3 625.0  2,334.0 10,364.0  1,707.4 8,980.0 
   tangibility 0.264 0.224 0.087 0.196 0.379  0.258 0.206  0.244 0.208 
   market/book 1.841 1.942 0.813 1.210 2.055  1.786 1.933  1.894 2.001 
            
Credit market conditions            
   default spread (in %) 0.955 0.466 0.680 0.860 1.080  1.226 0.547  0.813 0.260 
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Table 3. Effect of Tax Changes on Leverage.  
We estimate standard leverage regressions to test whether, and by how much, firms change their leverage in 
response to changes in state corporate income taxes in their headquarter state. For variable definitions and details of 
their construction, see Appendix C. To screen out firms with negative equity (distressed firms), we require that 
leverage be less than 1. Except in column 2, we capture tax changes using indicator variables for tax increases and 
tax cuts. In column 2, we use changes in a state’s top marginal tax rate. Note that three tax increases (CA 2002, NJ 
2002, and MI 2008) and one tax cut (TX 2008) cannot be summarized in terms of changes in marginal tax rates; see 
Appendix A and B. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. Column 4 restricts the sample of treated firms to those that 
suffer first a tax increase and then a subsequent tax cut (“reversals”). All specifications are estimated using OLS in 
first differences to remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and include industry-year fixed effects to 
remove industry shocks. The specifications shown in columns 3 and 4 additionally include firm fixed effects in the 
first-difference equation and are estimated using Stata’s reg2hdfe command for linear regressions with two high-
dimensional fixed effects. The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
  Dep. var.: Change in long-term book leverage 
 Baseline 
Baseline 
w/ changes 
in marginal 
rates 
Baseline 
w/ firm FE 
Reversals 
w/ firm FE 
Timing of 
tax 
changes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
=1 if tax rise at t = –2 (in %)     -0.405 
     0.349 
=1 if tax rise at t = –1 (in %) 1.142***  1.155*** 1.631** 1.076*** 
 0.295  0.340 0.655 0.306 
=1 if tax rise at t = 0 (in %)     -0.344 
     0.292 
=1 if tax rise at t = +1 (in %)     -0.076 
     0.320 
=1 if tax rise at t = +2 (in %)     -0.414 
     0.354 
=1 if tax cut at t = –1 (in %) -0.036  -0.135 0.174 -0.188 
 0.163  0.202 0.646 0.169 
Lagged increase in tax rate  0.347*    
  0.187    
Lagged cut in tax rate  0.080    
  0.224    
Lagged change in …      
   ROA -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 
 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.005 
   firm size 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.001 0.009*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
   tangibility 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.026** 0.021 0.041*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.010 
   market/book 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
   default spread -0.518*** -0.538*** -0.506*** -0.689** -0.641** 
 0.168 0.172 0.178 0.310 0.265 
Diagnostics      
R2  11.2% 11.2% 21.5% 34.0% 13.1% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 8.2*** 6.3** n.a. n.a. 5.9*** 
No. of firms 8,866 8,859 8,866 5,469 7,053 
No. of observations 73,547 72,890 73,547 33,915 57,278 
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Table 4. Robustness.  
To investigate robustness, columns 1 and 2 split the sample in 2000; column 3 adds state fixed effects; column 4 models total leverage; column 5 models long-
term leverage including debt due within one year; column 6 models market leverage; and column 7 models log real debt rather than a leverage ratio. For variable 
definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences to 
remove firm fixed effects in the levels equations and include industry-year fixed effects to remove industry shocks. (The specification shown in column 3 
additionally includes state fixed effects and is estimated using Stata’s reg2hdfe command for linear regressions with two high-dimensional fixed effects.) The 
fixed effects are not reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient 
estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
  Dep. var.: Change in book leverage       
 
long-term 
debt, 
1990-
1999 
long-term 
debt, 
2000-
2011 
long-term 
debt (w/ 
state FE) 
short-
term and 
long-term 
debt 
long-term 
(incl. 
current 
portion)  
Change in 
long-term 
market 
leverage  
Change in 
log real 
long-term 
debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) 
         
=1 if tax rise at t = –1 (in %, except col. 7) 1.092** 1.163*** 1.122*** 0.693** 1.150*** 0.714** 0.101*** 
 0.488 0.369 0.305 0.288 0.283 0.353 0.029 
=1 if tax cut at t = –1 (in %, except col. 7) -0.094 0.036 0.013 0.076 -0.011 -0.072 -0.016 
 0.223 0.242 0.180 0.169 0.165 0.182 1.408 
Lagged change in …        
   ROA -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.016 
 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.024 
   firm size 0.005** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.149*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.013 
   tangibility 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.037*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.390*** 
 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.069 
   market/book 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001** -0.001 0.001*** 0.012*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
   default spread -0.416 -0.539*** -0.518*** -0.679*** -0.564*** -1.369*** -5.726*** 
 0.684 0.170 0.168 0.170 0.160 0.211 1.961 
Diagnostics        
R2  10.7% 11.7% 11.3% 11.3% 11.1% 20.1% 11.4% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 2.5** 6.6*** n.a. 15.4*** 15.9*** 45.2*** 26.0*** 
No. of firms 6,967 5,559 8,866 8,839 8,850  8,892 8,866 
No. of observations 37,130 36,417 73,547 73,259 73,388  74,084 73,547 
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Table 5. Potential Confound: Local Business Cycle Effects.  
States may change corporate tax rates and firms may change leverage in response to unobserved changes in local 
business conditions. To examine this potential confound, column 1 adds lagged changes in state GSP growth rates, 
state unemployment rates, and state sales growth rates. Column 2 estimates a falsification test, asking whether firms 
respond to tax changes that occur in a neighboring state. Columns 3 and 4 compare the debt policies of firms subject 
to a state-level tax shock to control firms headquartered in bordering states only (column 3) and those located in far-
away states (column 4). Column 5 uses a restricted sample consisting of firms in adjacent counties either side of a 
state border, such that in year t, one or more firms in one county experience a tax shock while one or more firms in 
the adjacent county do not. The effect of common local economic shocks are then removed by including county-
pair/year fixed effects. Column 6 additionally requires that firms in adjacent county pairs operate in the same SIC4 
industry in year t. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. All specifications except column 6 are estimated using OLS in 
first differences with industry-year fixed effects (not shown for brevity). Column 6 instead includes county-pair/ 
industry/year fixed effects. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. Hetero-
skedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient 
estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
  Dep. var.: Change in long-term book leverage 
    
Firms in treated states 
versus …  
Firms in adjacent 
border counties  
 Full sample  
firms in 
border-
ing states 
firms in 
far-away 
states  
county-
pair/year 
FE & 
industry/ 
year FE 
county- 
pair/ 
industry/ 
year FE  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
=1 if tax rise at t = –1 (in %) 1.113*** 1.010*** 1.204*** 0.910*** 2.370*** 2.540*** 
 0.295 0.299 0.386 0.311 0.849 0.967 
=1 if tax cut at t = –1 (in %) -0.012 -0.007 -0.001 -0.033 -0.170 0.224 
 0.163 0.166 0.965 0.169 0.580 0.626 
=1 if tax rise in a bordering  -0.305**     
      state at t = –1 (in %)  0.140     
=1 if tax cut in a bordering   0.061     
      state at t = –1 (in %)  0.103     
Lagged change in …       
   ROA -0.005 -0.005 -0.017 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 
 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.014 0.025 
   firm size 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007 0.006*** -0.001 -0.024** 
 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.011 
   tangibility 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.021 0.037*** 0.052 -0.057 
 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.010 0.038 0.081 
   market/book 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
   default spread -0.519*** -0.521*** -0.554 -0.517*** -0.914 0.209 
 0.168 0.168 0.338 0.196 0.785 2.146 
   GSP growth rate 0.021 0.021 0.056 0.024 0.247 0.194 
 0.023 0.023 0.076 0.025 0.187 0.210 
   state unemployment rate 0.168* 0.175* 0.781*** 0.087 -0.009 -0.008 
 0.095 0.096 0.299 0.106 0.011 0.015 
   state sales growth rate 0.000      
 0.002      
Diagnostics       
R2  11.2% 11.2% 30.8% 12.1% 49.4% 33.1% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 6.0*** 6.1*** 2.9*** 4.9*** n.a. 1.6* 
No. of firms 8,866 8,866  5,033 8,780  2,047 448 
No. of observations 73,547 73,547  10,522 64,510  10,208 1,284 
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Table 6. Potential Confounds: Union Power and Political Leanings.  
Prior literature documents a positive correlation between leverage and union power, which in turn may correlate with a state’s decision to raise corporate taxes. 
To investigate this potential confound, we partition the sample into firms that are headquartered in states with either high or low union power (columns 1 and 2) 
or in states suffering large or no large employment shocks (columns 3 and 4). Table 1 shows that states that lean Democratic are more likely to increase corporate 
taxes. To examine if this leads to a spurious correlation between tax increases and leverage increases, columns 5 and 6 partition the sample into firms that are 
headquartered in states leaning Democratic or Republican, respectively. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. The unit of 
analysis is a firm-year. All specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-year fixed effects (not shown for brevity). Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. (Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for equal tax sensitivity is one-sided.) 
 
 Dep. var.: Change in long-term book leverage 
 States with …  States with …  States leaning … 
 
high 
union 
power 
low  
union 
power  
large 
employment 
shocks 
no large 
employment 
shocks  Democratic Republican 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
=1 if tax rise at t = –1 (in %) 0.795** 1.413*** 1.212*** 0.987*** 1.381*** 0.892* 
 0.353 0.482 0.451 0.355 0.449 0.519 
=1 if tax cut at t = –1 (in %) -0.076 0.317 0.215 0.156 0.168 0.797 
 0.139 0.485 0.267 0.288 0.266 0.598 
Lagged change in …       
   ROA -0.012** 0.007 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.015 
 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.010 
   firm size 0.005* 0.006 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.006** 0.008* 
 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 
   tangibility 0.030** 0.031 0.052*** 0.039 0.047*** 0.002 
 0.011 0.027 0.011 0.023 0.016 0.020 
   market/book 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   default spread -0.446* -0.242 -0.389** -0.607*** -0.527*** -0.535 
 0.226 0.492 0.165 0.188 0.202 0.456 
Diagnostics       
R2  18.8% 28.3% 16.9% 20.3% 17.1% 23.1% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 5.9*** 3.3*** 10.5*** 7.3*** 4.6*** 1.6 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 1.14 0.13 0.52 
No. of firms 5,490 2,882  5,213 3,852  5,079 4,114 
No. of observations 37,403 19,089  28,374 20,389  30,909 17,786 
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Table 7. Potential Measurement Error: Location of Operations And Sales.  
Firms are taxed wherever they operate. To the extent that sample firms have operations outside the state in which 
they are headquartered, our leverage regressions will underestimate the sensitivity of debt to taxes. To illustrate how 
this potential measurement error biases our estimates downwards, we use two sample partitions. The first partitions 
sample firms into multinationals and domestic firms. Multinationals should be less sensitive to changes in state taxes 
than domestic firms. The second partitions sample firms based on whether sales in their three-digit NAICS industry 
are predominantly inter-state or intra-state. Firms shipping predominantly outside their home state should be less 
sensitive to changes in state taxes than firms producing predominantly for their headquarter state. For variable 
definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. All specifications 
are estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-year fixed effects (not shown for brevity). 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in italics underneath the 
coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. (Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for equal tax sensitivity is one-sided.) 
 
 Dep. var.: Change in long-term book leverage 
 
multi-
nationals 
domestic 
firms  
high 
inter-state 
sales 
low inter-
state sales 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
      
=1 if tax rise at t = –1 (in %) 0.281 1.521*** 0.370 1.209** 
 0.422 0.472 0.577 0.480 
=1 if tax cut at t = –1 (in %) -0.186 0.120 -0.351 0.107 
 0.246 0.281 0.264 0.297 
Lagged change in …     
   ROA -0.020** -0.026** -0.015** 0.003 
 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.007 
   firm size 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.007** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
   tangibility 0.063*** 0.022 0.057*** 0.025 
 0.020 0.039 0.017 0.022 
   market/book -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   default spread -0.608*** -2.194 -0.537** -0.604* 
 0.216 1.713 0.257 0.327 
Diagnostics     
R2  21.6% 11.2% 10.3% 12.5% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 5.1*** 7.6*** 4.2*** 2.7*** 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 3.80**  2.13* 
No. of firms 4,032 6,627  2,387 2,353 
No. of observations 32,005 40,843  21,217 20,621 
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Table 8. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects.  
Higher taxes on equity income (e) dampen the impact of corporate tax changes on leverage. To test this comparative static, we split the sample according to two 
proxies for e: Dividends and institutional ownership. Non-dividend payers have lower e than dividend-payers because their investors derive their equity income 
solely in the form of (lower-taxed) capital gains. And firms that are predominantly owned by institutional investors have lower e than those predominantly 
owned by retail investors, as institutions are often tax exempt. A corollary of a causal interpretation of the observed tax sensitivity of debt is that it should vary 
with profits. Columns 5 and 6 partition sample firms according to whether they are profitable or loss-making in year 0. The extent to which a firm can increase its 
leverage when faced with a tax increase depends on its debt capacity. Columns 7 and 8 partition firms into those rated investment-grade and those rated below-
investment-grade by a credit rating agency. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix C. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. All 
specifications are estimated using OLS in first differences with industry-year fixed effects (not shown for brevity). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively. (Reflecting the signed nature of the predictions, the test for equal tax sensitivity is one-sided.) 
 
  Dep. var.: Change in long-term book leverage 
 
non-
dividend 
payers 
dividend 
payers   
high 
institu-
tional 
owner-
ship 
high 
retail 
owner-
ship  profitable 
loss-
making  
invest-
ment 
grade 
below 
invest- 
ment 
grade 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
=1 if tax rise at t = –1 (in %) 1.550*** 0.391 1.418*** 0.840 1.133*** 0.117 1.264** -0.100 
 0.420 0.476 0.536 0.702 0.313 0.905 0.535 1.482 
=1 if tax cut at t = –1 (in %) 0.166 -0.196 0.168 -0.068 -0.143 -0.022 0.027 0.008 
 0.223 0.297 0.313 0.340 0.176 0.511 0.306 0.806 
Lagged change in …         
   ROA -0.011** 0.007 0.003 -0.008 -0.008 0.003 -0.034 0.002 
 0.005 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.025 0.044 
   firm size 0.007*** 0.005 0.009** 0.005* 0.008*** 0.009*** -0.002 -0.006 
 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.007 
   tangibility 0.038*** 0.028 0.067*** 0.029** 0.026** 0.067*** 0.026 0.065* 
 0.011 0.018 0.024 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.025 0.038 
   market/book 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.004** -0.012*** 
 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 
   default spread -0.429** -0.757** -0.718*** -0.779* -0.629*** -0.308 -0.162 -0.924 
 0.217 0.329 0.241 0.464 0.187 0.420 0.313 0.674 
Diagnostics         
R2  16.3% 24.5% 23.5% 22.4% 14.5% 26.8% 12.5% 45.3% 
Wald test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 6.5*** 2.8*** 4.0*** 1.9* 7.2*** 3.4*** 9.0*** 2.4** 
Equal tax sensitivity? (F) 3.34**  1.01  2.29*  0.24 
No. of firms 7,360 3,896  3,643 5,232  7,227 4,585  713 1,729 
No. of observations 46,183 27,097  24,270 24,270  57,772 15,775  6,986 9,682 
 
